The Promising Animal: Memory, Forgetting, and the Fragility of Sovereignty in Nietzsche
Thesis In Nietzsche’s account, the capacity to promise does not rest on a stable, self-identical subject, but on a constitutive tension between forgetting and memory. The sovereign individual ( das souveräne Individuum ) emerges precisely from this instability: a subject produced through practices that regulate discontinuity rather than eliminate it. Read in this way, Nietzsche’s genealogy anticipates later critiques of the Cartesian subject in Freud, Foucault, and Derrida. The freedom of the sovereign individual is therefore neither original nor self-grounding, but the outcome of a long historical process that transforms instability into responsibility. Introduction: The Paradox of the Promising Animal “To breed an animal with the prerogative to promise—is that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind? Is it not the real problem of humankind?” (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 35). The opening of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morali...