Historicizing Objectivity: Lenin, Poststructuralism, and the Loss of Epistemic Innocence
Introduction: facts, interpretation, and an uneasy confidence In a recent televised exchange, a journalist invoked a familiar Leninist gesture: political claims, he suggested, must ultimately submit to facts; analysis begins and ends with what can be verified in practice. The appeal carried a certain force. It suggested clarity in a landscape often saturated with interpretation, narrative, and suspicion. Yet something in that gesture feels historically displaced. Not because facts have disappeared, nor because material reality has become secondary, but because the philosophical confidence that once accompanied such appeals no longer appears self-evident. The issue is not whether Lenin was “right” or “wrong.” It is that the conditions under which his epistemology could appear unproblematic have shifted. What once functioned as a relatively direct theory of knowledge now emerges as one articulation within a broader and more complex history of how truth is produced, stabilized, and ...