Return to Saussure

Abstract This article explores the distinctions and connections between natural languages and academic jargon, examining how philosophers like Saussure, Peirce, and Derrida have approached the creation and definition of terminology in their works. While Saussure and Peirce established conventional bonds with their readers through clear definitions, Derrida intentionally avoided doing so as part of his deconstructive strategy. This decision, while philosophically motivated, has led to significant interpretive challenges. A key example is Derrida's use of the word “writing,” which was redefined without explanation, causing confusion among listeners who took it in the literal sense of its ordinary use. The article discusses the implications of this approach, suggesting that a lack of clear definitions can hinder understanding, as observers may interpret philosophical terms based on their everyday meanings. The article concludes by proposing a more balanced approach to technicism

Introduction The argument made by Socrates against Thrasymachus in Book I of The Republic bears an intriguing parallel to the underlying assumption of Allan Lichtman’s "13 Keys" predictive model for U.S. presidential elections. At the core of both is the notion of rational decision-making: an idealized expectation of how rulers or voters ought to behave when making choices. Socrates challenges Thrasymachus’ claim that rulers always act in their own best interest, pointing out that they are fallible and can make irrational decisions. Similarly, Lichtman’s model presumes an analytical, pragmatic electorate that votes based on a clear evaluation of the incumbent party’s performance. When electors deviate from this sound behavior—due to biases, misinformation, or other emotional influences—the predictive framework fails. This parallel reveals a deeper issue in both political philosophy and electoral analysis: the limits of assuming that decision-makers are purely judicious ac

Introduction This article examines whether there is continuity or a shift in Nietzsche’s views on language between his early work, On the Future of Our Educational Institutions , and his later essay, On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense . At first glance, there appears to be a significant change: the former extols Greek and Latin as vehicles of higher wisdom, while the latter dissects linguistic tools as imperfect, metaphor-laden constructs that distort rather than reveal reality. However, a closer reading reveals a more nuanced relationship between these works, suggesting an evolution in Nietzsche's thought rather than a complete reversal. This article explores three key aspects of this relationship: (1) Nietzsche’s evolving analysis of linguistic forms, (2) his distinction between the “rational” and the “intuitive” man, and (3) the broader context of his philosophy regarding truth, art, and culture. 1. Nietzsche's Analysis of Linguistic Expression: From Greek an

Introduction Friedrich Nietzsche’s intricate relationship with Italian, French, and German literary traditions forms a crucial aspect of his cultural critique. Although he did not produce major works in Italian or French, his fluency in French and extended stays in Italy profoundly shaped his views on language and culture. He regarded Italian and French as languages that retained a closer affinity to the ideals of Latin and Greek, which he admired for their clarity, structure, and aesthetic form. By contrast, he found the contemporary German literary scene disconnected from these ancient roots, lacking the elegance and discipline he associated with classical antiquity. For him, writers like Goethe and Schiller represented a direct continuation of the Greek legacy, in sharp contrast to the popular authors of his time, whom he deemed superficial and derivative. This article examines Nietzsche’s admiration for Italian and French literary traditions, his sharp critique of modern Ge