Return to Saussure

The Machine of Lagado, lithography. AI image “Methinks I hear some objector, demanding with an air of pleasantry and ridicule: ‘Is there no speaking then without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned as learned; as well poor peasants, as profound philosophers?’” — George Berkeley, Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher Introduction In the third part of Gulliver's Travels (1726), Jonathan Swift describes one of the strangest inventions in literary history. At the Academy of Lagado, Gulliver encounters a gigantic apparatus composed of wooden frames covered with words. Students turn handles, rearranging verbal combinations at random. The machine's inventor proudly claims that, with sufficient effort, anyone could produce books on philosophy, law, science, and politics without the inconvenience of study. The episode was intended as satire. Yet nearly three centuries later, readers find themselves in an unusual position. Machines now translate doc...

Aber wie ist denn jene andre »düstre Sache«, das Bewusstsein der Schuld, das ganze »schlechte Gewissen« auf die Welt gekommen? Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (II §4) Thesis This article argues that Nietzsche’s genealogy of guilt in On the Genealogy of Morality depends upon a distinctly nineteenth-century philological assumption: that the history of a word can illuminate the history of a concept. By tracing the moral notion of Schuld (guilt) back to Schulden (debts), Nietzsche reconstructs the emergence of conscience from economic and juridical relations. From a Saussurean perspective, however, this procedure is methodologically problematic. Meaning does not survive within words as a historical residue but emerges from differential relations within a synchronic linguistic system. Through a dialogue with Saussure, and subsequently with Lacan and Derrida, this article examines the tension between genealogical explanation and structural theories of signification. The issue...

Introduction: facts, interpretation, and an uneasy confidence In a recent televised exchange, a journalist invoked a familiar Leninist gesture: political claims, he suggested, must ultimately submit to facts; analysis begins and ends with what can be verified in practice. The appeal carried a certain force. It suggested clarity in a landscape often saturated with interpretation, narrative, and suspicion. Yet something in that gesture feels historically displaced. Not because facts have disappeared, nor because material reality has become secondary, but because the philosophical confidence that once accompanied such appeals no longer appears self-evident. The issue is not whether Lenin was “right” or “wrong.” It is that the conditions under which his epistemology could appear unproblematic have shifted. What once functioned as a relatively direct theory of knowledge now emerges as one articulation within a broader and more complex history of how truth is produced, stabilized, and ...

Triple Self-Portrait. Norman Rockwell 1960. Source: Wikipedia Thesis Although Nietzsche's sovereign individual appears to embody self-mastery and responsibility, Derrida's analysis of blindness in Memoirs of the Blind reveals a structural limitation already operating within Nietzsche's account. Just as the self-portraitist cannot fully see himself while drawing, the promising subject cannot fully know the future self who must fulfill the promise. In both texts, selfhood emerges not from pure presence but from a relation to absence, interruption, and temporal distance. Introduction At first glance, Nietzsche's sovereign individual and Derrida's self-portraitist seem to inhabit entirely different philosophical worlds. One belongs to a genealogy of morality, responsibility, and promise; the other emerges from a meditation on drawing, vision, and memory. Yet both figures confront a surprisingly similar problem: the impossibility of complete self-presence. In th...