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Constellation: From Benjamin to Adorno

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1. The Problem: Why Does Adorno Need a Constellation? Philosophy cannot simply do without concepts. Whenever we try to understand something, we identify it as something: an event, an object, a historical process, a social relation. Concepts make such identification possible. Yet as soon as a particular is identified through a general term, a difficulty arises. What is singular about the thing may disappear from view. A concept tells us what an object has in common with other things that fall under the same category, but it does not necessarily capture what is distinctive about this particular one. This creates a tension at the heart of philosophical thought. On one side lies subsumption . If thought relies exclusively on universal concepts, individual things risk being treated merely as instances of a general rule. The particular becomes intelligible by being placed under something more general, but in the process what does not fit that generality may be overlooked. Thought gains o...

What a Constellation Reveals: Adorno, Language, and the Limits of Concepts

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I. Understanding the Procedure 1. What Conceptual Classification Leaves Out To understand something, we generally begin by identifying what kind of thing it is. We recognize a tree as a tree, a tool as a tool, or an activity as work by identifying characteristics that allow us to distinguish one thing from another. Concepts make this possible: they organize experience, establish distinctions, and provide a basis for knowledge. Without them, the world would remain difficult to recognize and understand. Yet identifying something through a concept involves selecting certain properties as relevant. A tree can be classified by its species, shape, or biological characteristics, but these determinations do not necessarily capture what makes this particular tree what it is: its history, its place in a landscape, or the significance it acquires through its relations with other things. The classification may be correct while leaving aspects of the individual object unexpressed. This dist...

Can Philosophy Leave Metaphor Behind? Derrida and the Problem of Proper Meaning

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Introduction — A Question About Philosophical Language A metaphor can help us express an idea by making it more accessible or vivid. We generally assume that the figurative expression can be distinguished from the meaning it conveys, so that once the idea has been understood, the metaphor can be set aside without losing anything essential. Earlier discussions have approached this problem from different directions: Nietzsche questioned the relation between language and conceptual formation, Lakoff and Johnson examined how metaphors organize thought, and a preceding article explored what remains when a metaphor becomes a concept. In White Mythology , Jacques Derrida examines the assumptions underlying the distinction between figurative expression and conceptual meaning. The distinction between metaphorical expression and proper meaning rests on the premise  that philosophy can separate the two with some degree of certainty. Derrida examines this belief  through an imag...