Inside the Language Game: Saussure and Wittgenstein's Chess Analogy

Introduction

Language has long fascinated linguists and philosophers. Ferdinand de Saussure and Ludwig Wittgenstein, though working in different intellectual traditions, converged on a crucial point: the need to rethink the nature of linguistic units. Moving beyond the conventional view that words simply name things, both thinkers explored the internal logic of language, skillfully employing the metaphor of a chess game to reveal how meaning arises not from reference, but from systemic function.

Challenging Conventions: The Question of Linguistic Identity

Central to the inquiries of both Saussure and Wittgenstein is the problem of linguistic identity. What makes a word what it is, apart from its supposed connection to an object? Can meaning be accounted for without appealing to an act of naming? They put it this way:

`Wer von einem Tag auf den andern verspricht »Morgen will ich dich besuchen« – sagt der jeden Tag das Gleiche; oder jeden Tag etwas anderes? ´ — Philosophische Untersuchungen [226]

`Lorsque, dans une conférence, on entend répéter à plusieurs reprises le mot Messieurs !, on a le sentiment qu’il s’agit chaque fois de la même expression, et pourtant les variations de débit et l’intonation la présentent, dans les divers passages, avec des différences phoniques très appréciables — aussi appréciables que celles qui servent ailleurs à distinguer des mots différents (cf. pomme et paume, goutte et je goûte, fuir et fouir, etc.)´ — Cours de linguistique générale [151]

These passages point to a deeper issue: that linguistic identity cannot be reduced to phonetic form or referential constancy. Both thinkers questioned earlier models of language that rested on the simplistic idea of naming—often associated with a representational theory of language. Saussure and Wittgenstein instead sought to uncover how words acquire meaning within a system or context, not from a direct link to things in the world.

The traditional paradigm—often labeled the nomenclature model—conceives of language as a set of labels attached to objects. But this view, they argued, fails to explain how language actually functions. For them, the nature of meaning lies not in the association between word and thing, but in the position a sign occupies within a network of rules and differences.

The Chessboard Analogy: Modeling Language Without External Reference

To express their shared insights, Saussure and Wittgenstein each turned to the metaphor of chess. This analogy allowed them to articulate how the identity and function of a linguistic element depend on its role within a structured system, not on its material substance or referential tie.

Wittgenstein drew this parallel explicitly, emphasizing that the nature of a word is not given by its physical properties but by its use in accordance with certain rules:

`…Wir reden von dem räumlichen und zeitlichen Phänomen der Sprache; nicht von einem unräumlichen und unzeitlichen Unding. [Nur kann man sich in verschiedener Weise für ein Phänomen interessieren.] Aber wir reden von ihr so, wie von den Figuren des Schachspiels, indem wir Spielregeln für sie angeben, nicht ihre physikalischen Eigenschaften beschreiben. Die Frage »Was ist eigentlich ein Wort?« ist analog der »Was ist eine Schachfigur?« ´— Philosophische Untersuchungen [108]

Similarly, Saussure’s favorite illustration was the chess game. For him, the replacement of wooden pieces with ivory ones made no difference to the function of the game. What mattered was not their substance, but their position and role within the structured whole. However, changing the number of pieces would alter the game’s very grammar—just as shifting elements in language can transform its meaning:

`…la langue est un système qui ne connaît que son ordre propre. Une comparaison avec le jeu d’échecs le fera mieux sentir. Là, il est relativement facile de distinguer ce qui est externe de ce qui est interne : le fait qu’il a passé de Perse en Europe est d’ordre externe ; interne, au contraire, tout ce qui concerne le système et les règles. Si je remplace des pièces de bois par des pièces d’ivoire, le changement est indifférent pour le système : mais si je diminue ou augmente le nombre des pièces, ce changement-là atteint profondément la « grammaire » du jeu´ — Cours de linguistique générale [43]

Both analogies emphasize the internal organization of meaning: it is not the “thingness” of the piece or word that matters, but the rules that govern its function within the system.

Converging Paths: Language as System and Practice

Although their intellectual paths differed, Saussure and Wittgenstein both rejected the idea that words derive meaning from their relationship to objects. Instead, they showed that meaning is shaped by relational positioning within a structured field—whether that field is a system of differences (Saussure) or a rule-governed activity embedded in use (Wittgenstein).

The chess analogy thus becomes more than a pedagogical tool—it embodies a shared philosophical stance. In opposing the referential model, both thinkers direct attention inward: Saussure to the synchronic system of signs (la langue), and Wittgenstein to the rule-following practices that give rise to meaning in use (language games).

Conclusion

Through the metaphor of chess, Saussure and Wittgenstein call into question the nomenclaturist theory of language and redirected our gaze toward the structural and functional aspects of linguistic identity. Whether in Saussure’s structured sign system or Wittgenstein’s pragmatic rule-following, both thinkers underscored that the identity of a word—like a chess piece—emerges from its position in a network of relations. The game of language, they reveal, plays out entirely within its own boundaries. To understand language is not to trace its words to the world outside, but to learn the rules of the game being played.

Bibliography

Harris, Roy. Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words. Routledge, 1990.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger. Libraire Payot.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, G. H. Von Wright, Ludwig Wittgenstein Werkausgabe, Band 1 (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1999).