A Copernican Linguistic Turn: Reframing Saussure’s Impact Through Kuhn and Feyerabend

Introduction

Ferdinand de Saussure’s observation in Course in General Linguistics that “the object is not given in advance of the viewpoint” challenged the idea that linguistic phenomena exist independently of analysis. Instead, he argued that the observer’s perspective actively constructs the object of study. This insight, which later became central to modern philosophy of science, poststructuralist thought, and other areas, extends beyond linguistics to knowledge production more broadly. However, his intellectual background in positivism limited his ability to recognize the full implications of his argument. The influence of positivist methodology prevented him from fully exploring the active role of the analyst in shaping understanding—particularly in relation to the natural sciences, which, in the early 20th century, were still largely regarded as uncovering objective truths.

Since then, developments in the philosophy of science—especially the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend—have reinforced and expanded Saussure’s point of view. Kuhn’s theory of paradigms illustrates how scientific research is guided by prevailing theoretical frameworks, which define what counts as a legitimate subject of study. Feyerabend, in turn, critiques the assumption that a universal scientific method can reveal reality independently of conceptual schemes. By integrating Saussure’s insights with these frameworks, this article demonstrates that knowledge is inherently shaped by viewpoint—not only in linguistics but across disciplines.

Saussure and the Constructed Nature of Objects

Saussure illustrated the dependence of linguistic units on perspective with the example of the French word nu (“naked”). At first glance, he writes, this might appear to be a clearly defined linguistic unit. However, depending on the analytical approach, nu can be understood as a mere sound, a bearer of meaning, or a historical derivation from the Latin nūdum. The unit of study shifts according to the framework employed. He thus posed a fundamental question: “What is it that linguistics sets out to analyse?” Unlike disciplines such as physics, where bodies and phenomena seem given in advance, linguistics faces a unique challenge—its subject matter is inseparable from the perspective applied to it:“What is the actual object of study in its entirety? The question is a particularly difficult one […] Other sciences are provided with objects of study given in advance, which are then examined from different points of view. Nothing like that is the case in linguistics.”

However, this distinction is misleading. As later thinkers have demonstrated, even in the hard sciences, objects of inquiry are not simply “found” but shaped by underlying theoretical assumptions. Saussure’s positivist background prevented him from fully grasping the broader implications of his insight, restricting the potential applications of his own linguistic theory.

In this sense, his position parallels that of the Austrian Emperor Maximilian I (1459–1519), who was known as Der Letzte Ritter ("The Last Knight") and Der Erste Kanonier ("The First Gunner"). Maximilian was deeply invested in medieval chivalry yet also modernized warfare by introducing early artillery, marking a transition from medieval to early modern military strategy. Similarly, Saussure occupied a transitional position in intellectual history: while grounded in positivism, his work laid the foundation for later movements such as postpositivism, poststructuralism, critical theory, scientific realism, and pragmatism. Just as Maximilian embodied both tradition and innovation, Saussure’s theories straddled two intellectual paradigms—rooted in the past yet anticipating future developments.

Kuhn’s Paradigms and the Structuring of Scientific Objects

Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms challenges the notion that science is a purely objective pursuit of truth. A paradigm is more than a collection of theories; it is an overarching framework that shapes how researchers define problems, formulate hypotheses, and interpret data. Crucially, Kuhn argues that paradigms determine what is recognized as a legitimate scientific phenomenon. As he states, “Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions” (Kuhn, 1962/1996).

For example, before Einstein’s theory of relativity, space and time were regarded as absolute within the Newtonian theoretical framework. This assumption structured scientific inquiry for centuries, influencing both the formulation of questions and the interpretation of results. However, Einstein’s work redefined space-time as a relative construct, fundamentally altering the framework within which scientific concepts were understood.

This shift illustrates that the entities studied by science do not exist independently of the theoretical lens that defines them. Just as Saussure demonstrated that linguistic units acquire identity based on the analytical approach applied to them, Kuhn shows that scientific constructs are structured by the conceptual prism through which they are interpreted. Scientific revolutions, therefore, do not merely accumulate new knowledge; they transform what is recognized as reality itself.

Feyerabend and the Theory-Ladenness of Observation

While Kuhn highlights how paradigms shape the definition of scientific objects, Paul Feyerabend goes further by challenging the very notion of a fixed scientific method. He argues that there is no universal procedure governing knowledge production and that observation is always influenced by prior theoretical commitments. In Against Method, Feyerabend asserts, “Science is essentially an anarchic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives” (Feyerabend, 1975/2010). This view undermines the idea that science can provide a neutral, objective account of the world. In this regard, Feyerabend’s perspective resonates strongly with Ferdinand de Saussure, who noted that “...one might say that it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object. Furthermore, there is nothing to tell us in advance whether one of these ways of looking at it is prior to or superior to any of the others” (Saussure, CGL).

Feyerabend’s analysis of Galileo’s defense of heliocentrism illustrates this principle. At the time, the dominant Aristotelian worldview held that celestial bodies moved in perfect circles around a stationary Earth. When Galileo observed Jupiter’s moons orbiting the planet, his findings contradicted this intellectual framework, yet they were dismissed by many scholars because the prevailing theoretical model rendered them unintelligible. According to Feyerabend, Galileo did not simply discover new facts; he actively reinterpreted reality using a different conceptual scheme.

This insight aligns closely with Saussure’s argument that linguistic entities depend on the perspective adopted. Just as the French word nu can be analyzed as a mere sound, a bearer of meaning, or a historical derivation, scientific observations take on different meanings depending on the theoretical framework applied. Feyerabend’s radical conclusion reinforces the idea that knowledge is not built upon fixed foundations but emerges through competing interpretations.

Conclusion: The Universal Implications of Saussure’s Insight

Saussure’s claim that “the viewpoint creates the object” remains as relevant today as it was in his time. While originally formulated within linguistics, his insight has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of information across disciplines. Kuhn’s theory of paradigms reinforces the idea that scientific constructs are not pre-existing entities but are shaped by the conceptual frameworks that scientists operate within. Feyerabend takes this further, arguing that observation itself is never neutral but is always mediated by theoretical assumptions. Together, these views reveal that knowledge—whether in linguistics, science, or any other field—is not about merely uncovering an independent reality but about constructing it through perspective and interpretation.

However, despite the radical nature of his insight, Saussure himself may not have fully grasped its universal implications. His intellectual background in positivism likely constrained his ability to extend his argument beyond linguistics. Unlike later thinkers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, who openly questioned the objectivity of scientific inquiry, Saussure remained within a methodological framework that largely assumed the natural sciences could uncover objective truths. This limitation prevented him from recognizing that his “Copernican revolution” in linguistics applied not just to linguistics but to knowledge production as a whole.

If every field defines its objects through its own conceptual scheme, as Saussure suggests, we must critically reconsider claims to absolute truth. What does it mean for an idea to be “true” if all understanding is contingent on viewpoint? This question—at the heart of both linguistics and philosophy—demonstrates the enduring significance of Saussure’s insight in contemporary thought. While he may not have anticipated its full scope, his work laid the groundwork for a broader epistemological shift, one that continues to challenge how we define cognition and reality today.

Related Post

The Viewpoint Creates the Object: Revisiting Saussure’s Insights

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2025/02/blog-post_23.html

Bibliography

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