Halting the Infinite Regress: Why Every System Needs Its Own Transcendental Signified

"School of Athens"—detail showing Euclid.

Introduction: Toward a Plurality of Foundations

The idea that systems of thought operate according to internal principles has profound implications for how we approach truth, meaning, and the very structure of knowledge. Derrida’s critique of the transcendental signified—a term he deploys to name the illusory promise of a final, absolute meaning—is among the most influential contributions to 20th-century philosophy. However, if we are to take seriously the Saussurean insight that meaning arises only within a system of differences, then Derrida's own critique must also be considered as internal to the system of deconstruction. This article proposes a measured approach: rather than accepting différance as a metaphysical absolute, we should treat it as a system-relative insight, comparable to the foundational principles of Euclidean geometry or the transcendentals of medieval thought. By putting Derrida in dialogue with Euclid, Plato, scholastic philosophers and Saussure, we argue that the critique of foundationalism must itself be subject to the same systemic relativism it advocates. To avoid lapsing into a Derridean dogma, we must resist turning différance into the very kind of privileged signified it was designed to dismantle.

Euclidean Geometry and the Conditionality of Axioms

The axioms of Euclidean geometry serve as a model for system-bound truth. Within the Euclidean framework, statements such as "the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees" are not empirically derived but follow necessarily from a chosen set of postulates. The fifth postulate of Euclid’s geometry, concerning parallel lines, is particularly illustrative. When mathematicians began to question it and instead assumed that there could be many parallels (as in hyperbolic geometry) or none (as in elliptic geometry), they discovered new forms of geometry that were just as internally consistent as Euclid’s—despite contradicting it. Its independence allowed for the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries, each with internally consistent theorems that contradict those of Euclid. The implication is clear: truth, in mathematics as in philosophy, is not universal but conditional upon the presupposed system.

Just as Euclidean truths hold only within a specific framework, Platonic Forms too must be understood within the ontological assumptions of Platonic realism. The Form of the Good, for instance, provides an explanatory horizon within that metaphysical system, analogous to the way the parallel postulate grounds the Euclidean structure. Neither is self-evident across all systems; each is a “transcendental signified” relative to its domain.

The Medieval Transcendentals and the Structure of Thought

Medieval scholasticism identified transcendentals such as unum (unity), verum (truth), and bonum (good) as concepts coextensive with being (ens). These were thought to be present in every possible category and thus immune to relativization. Yet, like Euclidean axioms, they gain their significance from the theological and metaphysical scaffolding that supports them. They function as the structuring principles of a system, not unlike Derrida’s notion of the center that structures presence in any metaphysical edifice—even if that center itself is shown to be mobile and ultimately unstable.

Derrida’s gesture, in Of Grammatology, is to expose the historical sedimentation of these centers. As he writes, “There is no presence before and outside semiological difference”[1]. However, to recognize this is not to stand outside all systems, but rather to adopt a different one. Différance itself becomes the “new center,” the very condition of systemic functioning.

Saussure’s Structuralism and the System-Dependence of Meaning

Saussure's structural linguistics established that the value of a sign arises not from its positive content but from its difference from other signs. There is no inherent bond between signifier and signified; the relationship is arbitrary and maintained only within the structure of the system. Thus, meaning is not discovered but constructed, not given but generated.

This is the foundational insight Derrida radicalizes. However, Derrida’s claim that “there is no transcendental or privileged signified that escapes the play of signification”[2] can only be made within the assumptions of the Saussurean system; it wouldn’t hold in a nomenclaturist paradigm. Without a structure of differences, the very idea of différance would lose intelligibility. Derrida’s critique thus remains parasitic on the system it deconstructs; he cannot fully transcend it without reintroducing the kind of fixed ground he critiques.

To universalize différance would be to commit a contradiction: asserting the non-existence of all transcendental signifieds as a transcendental signified. This move would replicate the metaphysical gesture Derrida deconstructs, transforming his critique into an unacknowledged dogma.

A Caution Against Derridean Dogma

Recognizing that truths are always system-dependent does not diminish the critical power of deconstruction; rather, it places that power within proper bounds. The assertion that “every system has its own transcendental signified” does not mean that all truths are equally valid or that relativism reigns unchecked. Rather, it encourages us to recognize the internal logics of different conceptual structures and to apply critical scrutiny evenly, including to the system of deconstruction itself.

Derrida famously notes, “The center is not the center”[3]. But even this insight presupposes a system where the concept of "center" still holds heuristic value. Just as the medieval transcendentals required an ontotheological structure to render them intelligible, and Euclidean axioms need a postulate-bound framework, différance requires the system of differential meaning established by Saussure.

To elevate différance to an absolute would be to posit a new metaphysics, a “Derridean Platonism” under another name. It is therefore imperative that philosophers, even those sympathetic to deconstruction, resist the urge to treat its principles as final or exempt from the systemic critique they enable.

Conclusion: Embracing Systemic Reflexivity

In conclusion, philosophical reflection must remain vigilant not only toward the metaphysical assumptions of traditional systems but also toward the foundational gestures within its own critique. The lesson of Saussure, and indirectly of Euclid and the medieval transcendentals, is that meaning and truth are functions of systemic relations. Derrida’s différance is an immensely powerful tool for interrogating presence and metaphysics, but it must be wielded with the same systemic reflexivity it demands of others.

To remain consistent, one must resist the temptation to canonize deconstruction as a final stance. Instead, we might affirm a pluralistic epistemology: each system generates its own "transcendental signified," not as a metaphysical truth, but as a necessary structural function. The task of philosophy is not to abolish foundations, but to understand their contingency. Only then can we avoid replacing old absolutes with new dogmas, and instead foster a genuinely critical, open-ended discourse.

Related Post

No Final Word: Derrida and the Myth of the Transcendental Signified

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2025/04/blog-post_328.html

 Writing as Origin: Derrida, Nietzsche, and the Systemic Genesis of Meaning

https://nietzscheanlinguistics.blogspot.com/2025/04/blog-post.html

References

1. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
2. Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
3. Eco, Umberto. The Search for the Perfect Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
4. Aristotle. Metaphysics. Trans. W.D. Ross. In The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
5. Gilson, Étienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Random House, 1956.

Footnotes

1. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 50.
2. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Ibid., p. 279.