Saussure and the Epoch of the Logos: Tracing the Evolution of the Sign in Western Philosophy

 

Introduction

Some scholars believe there is a common thread running through the entire Western philosophical tradition, enabling them to group together under the heading "The Concept of the Sign" terms as disparate as the Aristotelian σύμβολον (symbol) or σημείον (sign), the Augustinian signum, and the Saussurean signe (Derrida, 1997; Derrida 1981). This assumption may not hold water, but even if we acknowledge some commonalities among these three concepts that could justify their categorization together, we must ask: How central is 'the concept of the sign' to Saussurean linguistics? If the concept of the sign is not central or differs from the tradition, should we still include it in the epoch of the logos?"

With these questions in mind, we now turn our attention to surviving materials associated with each thinker to explore the theoretical underpinnings and historical implications of the concept of the sign within their respective philosophical or linguistic frameworks and its alleged connection to the metaphysics of presence.

Absence of Pre-established Signified and Signifier in Language

We will begin our investigation with the passage from the Course we reproduce below. Our selection of this particular quote is arbitrary; it could have been any other. As Derrida said, “we have to start somewhere:”

“No ideas are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic structure. But do sounds, which lie outside this nebulous world of thought, in themselves constitute entities established in advance? No more than ideas do.

The characteristic role of a language in relation to thought is not to supply the material phonetic means by which ideas may be expressed. It is to act as intermediary between thought and sound, in such a way that the combination of both necessarily produces a mutually complementary delimitation of units”. [CGL] [155-156]

The thesis emerging from this selection of the Cours is that language (la langue) is essential for the existence of linguistic units (signe) because neither ideas (signifié) nor sounds (signifiant) are distinct or established in advance. La langue functions as an intermediary, combining thought and sound to produce distinct units (signe). This structure creates a necessary delimitation, making precise linguistic units possible.

This represents a significant departure from previous linguistic traditions, which assumed a pre-existing list of names ready to be applied to a pre-existing list of things in the world. Let's analyze two more excerpts from the Cours to further develop this hypothesis.

Reassessing the Concept of Sign as Isolated Entities

“…it is a great mistake to consider a sign as nothing more than the combination of a certain sound and a certain concept. To think of a sign as nothing more would be to isolate it from the system to which it belongs. It would be to suppose that a start could be made with individual signs, and a system constructed by putting them together. On the contrary, the system as a united whole is the starting point, from which it becomes possible, by a process of analysis, to identify its constituent elements”. [CGL] [157]

This quote clarifies the idea that "la langue," or the language system, must be the starting point, not the individual linguistic sign. La langue provides the context within which individual signs can be actualized. By focusing on la langue, Saussure advocates for a top-down approach. He begins with the entire language system and uses this comprehensive perspective to analyze individual signs within it. This method ensures that each sign is understood as part of a network of interrelated and differential elements. Therefore, the system as a unified whole is the foundation from which the analysis of constituent elements, the linguistic signs, becomes possible. This perspective contrasts sharply with a bottom-up approach, where one might erroneously try to build an understanding of language by starting with individual signs and attempting to piece together the system from these isolated units.

Role of Conventions in Delimiting Linguistic Units

Let's now turn our attention to the second fragment, which seems to provide additional support for the idea that it could be erroneous to identify the sign, as Saussure conceived it, with the sign in the Aristotelian or Augustinian tradition:

“…a language does not present itself to us as a set of signs already delimited, requiring us merely to study their meanings and organisation. It is an indistinct mass, in which attention and habit alone enable us to distinguish particular elements. The unit has no special phonic character, and the only definition it can be given is the following: a segment of sound which is, as distinct from what precedes and follows in the spoken sequence, the signal of a certain concept”. [CGL] [146]

In this quote, Saussure reiterates that a language (la langue) should not be seen as a pre-defined set of signs (signe) awaiting analysis. He argues that distinctions between individual elements (signe) are not inherently obvious but are recognized through attention and habit. This perspective aligns with his broader assertion that the language system as a whole must be considered before the linguist can accurately identify and analyze its constituent signs. Signs (signe) do not inherently possess distinct boundaries; rather, they emerge from the language through a process of differentiation that relies on habitual and attentive engagement with the language system.

The Concept of the Sign in Aristotle, Augustine, and Saussure

Before we conclude our investigation, let's examine how scholars have understood the concept of the sign in the works of Aristotle, Augustine, and Saussure, drawing upon some available materials.

We can glimpse Aristotle's understanding of the "sign" in his treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας (Peri Hermeneias), where we read:

Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same. (16a3-8)

In this passage from On Interpretation, Aristotle posits that objects in the world are mirrored in our souls as images, and these images are the same for everyone, universal. These mental impressions can be expressed in spoken or written words (signs), but the ways we express them (the sign systems) vary, as evidenced by the variety of languages.

In De Dialectica, Augustine defines a sign as quod se ipsum sensui, et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit: “something that shows itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind” (Daylight, Aristotle and Augustine). According to Augustine, a sign is something perceivable by the senses that gives rise to an intelligible (understandable or conceptual) idea. This means that a sign is an object or phenomenon we perceive with our senses, which then leads us to understand or think of something else. For Augustine, signs encompass both natural indications (like smoke indicating fire) and symbolic representations (like words in language), bringing together relations of implication and substitution under a single concept.

Unlike Aristotle and Augustine, Saussure defines the sign in a different way:

A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer’s psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a more abstract kind: the concept. The linguistic sign is, then, a two-sided psychological entity [CGL] [98-99]

When he writes, “For some people a language, reduced to its essentials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding to a list of things,” [CGL] [97], he seems to hint at his departure from the previous linguistic and philosophical traditions that conceived of language as a picture dictionary, adding that “This conception is open to a number of objections. It assumes that ideas already exist independently of words.”

As we compare the definitions of "sign" provided by Aristotle, Augustine, and Saussure, a notable contrast emerges. While Aristotle and Augustine view the sign as something that stands for or represents something else, Saussure introduces a distinct perspective. For Saussure, the sign is not merely a link between a thing and a name, but rather between a concept and a sound pattern. This conceptualization introduces a different quality to the equation, diverging from the traditional understanding of the sign as "aliquid stat pro aliquo." Saussure's emphasis on the psychological impression of sound patterns and the abstract nature of concepts highlights a shift in the conceptualization of signs, departing from previous linguistic and philosophical traditions.

Partial Conclusion

Let's now revisit the questions we initially posed and offer some tentative answers:

1. Is there a golden thread running through the Aristotelian σύμβολον (symbol) or σημείον (sign), the Augustinian signum (sign), and the Saussurean signe (sign)?
2. How central is the concept of the sign to Saussurean linguistics?
3. Does the sign, as defined by Saussure, allow for its inclusion within a metaphysics of presence?

Possible answers:

1. The Aristotelian σύμβολον (symbol) or σημείον (sign), the Augustinian signum (sign), and the Saussurean signe (sign) each contribute to the discourse on signs within Western philosophical tradition. While they share some commonalities in their acknowledgment of the relationship between linguistic elements and the world they represent, Saussure's conceptualization diverges significantly. Unlike Aristotle and Augustine, who view signs as standing for or representing something else, "aliquid stat pro aliquo," Saussure introduces a different perspective. He defines the linguistic sign not as a mere link between a thing and a name, but as the association between a concept and a sound pattern. This departure from previous traditions marks a significant shift in the conceptualization of signs, highlighting Saussure's contribution to linguistic theory.
2. The concept of the sign is not central to Saussurean linguistics; rather, it is the language system (la langue) that takes precedence, serving as the condition of possibility. Saussure emphasizes that linguistic units can only exist within this system, not as isolated entities. He argues for a top-down approach, starting with the entire language system to delimit, understand and analyze individual signs within it. This perspective contrasts with previous linguistic traditions that treated signs as pre-existing entities awaiting application to objects in the world.
3. It seems that the Saussurean sign does not permit its inclusion within a metaphysics of presence. In Saussure's theory, signs are defined as values, as play of differences rather than positive entities. They are defined negatively, by what they are not, and thus can never be wholly present on their own. Instead, they require the cooperation of other elements within the language system for their being. This understanding of signs aligns more with a “metaphysics of non-being” rather than presence.

All things considered, even if we allow for the existence of a golden thread running through the concept of the sign in Aristotle, Augustine, and Saussure, even when Saussure’s only originality is psychologism, as Derrida believes (Derrida, 1973), it wouldn't necessarily include the Saussurean sign within the metaphysics of presence, the epoch of the logos. In his linguistic theory, the sign is a value, an entity in the making, a work in progress, a play of difference, in sum:

…a walking shadow, a poor player,

That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,

And then is heard no more. It is a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,

Signifying nothing.

Related Posts:

The Differential Nature of Language: An Analysis of Linguistic Levels

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2024/02/blog-post_12.html

Nomenclature vs Semiology: Understanding the Relation Language/Reality in Saussure's Theory

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2024/03/blog-post_30.html

Cite this page:

Rodie. (2024). Return to Saussure. Retrieved from http://www.derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com

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