Interrogating Origins: Kant's Conditions of Possibility and Derrida's Arche-Trace

 Introduction

In Derrida's "Of Grammatology," the concept of arche-trace challenges traditional notions of origin and presence in philosophical discourse. Ann Smock, in her analysis of Derrida's text in the book Reading Derrida's Of Grammatology, underscores the provocative nature of this concept encapsulated in the remark "this concept destroys its name" (OG 61; DG 90). Derrida posits that the arche-trace must simultaneously acknowledge its necessity and the inherent erasure implied by its existence: ‘The concept of the arche-trace must do justice both to this necessity and to this erasure’ (OG 61). This enigmatic statement has sparked numerous interpretations and scholarly debates, inviting a deeper exploration into its implications.

In this article, we explore this section of the book Reading Derrida's Of Grammatology where the elusive concept of arche-trace is discussed and try to shed light on its implicit meaning by invoking Kant's philosophical framework, particularly focusing on Kant's concepts of a priori knowledge and conditions of possibility. This comparative analysis seeks not only to highlight convergences but also to delineate the distinct approaches each thinker takes towards addressing the foundational principles that underpin our cognitive and linguistic frameworks.

The Paradox of Arche-Trace: Defying Conventional Origins in Philosophical Inquiry

This concept destroys its name (OG 61; DG 90). “This concept” refers in this quote to the concept of arche-trace.  There are metaphysical concepts like being that should be written under erasure, but this particular concept erases itself, it makes its necessity felt and thereby crosses itself out: ‘The concept of the arche-trace must do justice both to this necessity and to this erasure’ (OG 61). From this we feel tempted to conclude that arche-trace must exist, but because of what it is, there is no place for its existence.

In other words, if the arche-trace is supposed to be foundational or originative, then it should be present as a definitive concept or entity. However, Derrida argues that for the arche-trace to be the origin, it cannot be located in any specific place or time because it is always already in place.

The paradox here revolves around the tension between presence and absence. The concept of arche-trace is caught in this tension: it is supposed to be the origin, but if it is truly the origin, it cannot have a specific, fixed place because it is the condition of possibility for all presence and meaning. Hence, in trying to identify or locate the arche-trace, we realize that it eludes any specific location or definition, embodying the idea that "there is evidently no place for it." These considerations naturally lead us to examine the conceptual framework of Immanuel Kant as presented in his Critique of Pure Reason.

Tracing Arche-Trace: Kantian Tools for Understanding Derrida

The trace (or arche-trace) in Derrida´s philosophy is not a remnant of a lost origin. Instead, it signifies that there never was a true origin. This means that what we think of as an origin is actually constituted by something non-original—a trace. Therefore, the trace itself is the origin of what we perceive as the origin. The term "arche-trace" indicates that there is no fundamental starting point or primal position. But what could that mean?

In Kant's philosophy, "de facto" denotes what exists in reality or practice, whereas "de jure" refers to something that exists by law or rightful authority. The polysemic nature of the word "principle," which means both "Beginning or Origin" (de facto principle) and "Reason or Purpose" (de jure principle), effectively illustrates these concepts.

The de facto principle signifies what comes first in practice or chronology. For instance, mastication (chewing) is the de facto principle of digestion because it is the initial step in the physical process of breaking down food. In contrast, the de jure principle denotes the underlying justification or fundamental reason behind a process. In the context of digestion, the de jure principle is the transformation of food into blood, which represents the ultimate purpose of the digestive process. (García Morente, 1917).

Thus, "principle" encapsulates both the idea of an initial step in a process (beginning) and the underlying rationale (reason), demonstrating its polysemic character. At the risk of giving away the punch line, the word "trace" is, wait for it, a polysemic word. Every time Derrida uses it, we have to be attentive to the sense in which it is being used: is it a remnant of a lost origin or does it mean that there never was an origin in the first place?

The Kantian concepts of "de facto" and "de jure" intertwine with the notion of the "regulative idea." Kant proposed that humans naturally seek knowledge beyond what is immediately observable or demonstrable. When confronted with the limits of empirical observation and rational inquiry, we posit certain ideas or principles to guide our understanding. While these ideas are not empirically provable, they nonetheless provide coherence and direction to human thought and investigation.

When confronted with phenomena that challenge our current understanding, we often postulate conditions of possibility retrospectively, such as time and space, to interpret these events. Such frameworks organize sensory input, allowing us to make sense of our experiences—a concept central to Kant's assertion that we impose these a priori forms to structure and understand our perceptions.

However, this process reveals a paradox. While we initially project these conditions onto our experiences to interpret them, this projection also serves as a retrospective tool. Once these conditions are established through reflection and philosophical inquiry, we can apply them retrospectively to comprehend all past and future experiences consistently. This analysis suggests a resonance between the concept of arche-trace and Kant's notion of conditions of possibility.

The concept of arche-trace, as articulated by Derrida, is "necessary" for ensuring the coherence of language and "the world," similar to Kant's assertion regarding the indispensable nature of a priori conditions in human cognition and experience. Both Derrida and Kant argue that these conditions must be inherent—existing "always already"—to establish a framework within which understanding and meaningful engagement with reality can occur. However, it is important to note that arche-trace exists in the sphere of "de jure" rather than "de facto."

Derrida's assertion that arche-trace "destroys its name" reflects a paradoxical necessity inherent in its existence. Similar to Kant's perspective on a priori forms (de jure principle), which are foundational conditions for understanding reality yet paradoxically evade direct observation, the arche-trace's originary role is essential yet impossible to grasp. This paradox highlights the non-originality of the trace; it does not signify, as we said above, a remnant of a past origin but rather constitutes the very possibility of origin itself—a concept that aligns with Kant's view that our cognitive structures impose coherence on our perceptions, despite these structures being imperceptible in themselves.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the exploration of Kantian and Derridean conceptual frameworks reveals significant intersections (and divergences) that enrich our understanding of philosophical inquiry. Kant’s emphasis on a priori knowledge and conditions of possibility provides a structured foundation from which Derrida critiques notions of origins and presence through the concept of arche-trace. Both Kant and Derrida challenge traditional assumptions about knowledge and reality, albeit from distinct philosophical vantage points. Kantian philosophy elucidates the necessity of inherent cognitive structures for meaningful engagement with empirical data, while Derrida’s deconstructive method interrogates the foundational assumptions that underpin these structures, emphasizing their paradoxical nature and the complexities of conceptual frameworks. This paradox underscores the non-originality of the trace; it does not signify a remnant of a past origin but rather constitutes the very possibility of origin itself—a concept aligned with Kant’s view that our cognitive structures impose coherence on our perceptions, despite these structures being imperceptible in themselves.

 Related Post:

The Power of Polysemic Words: Articulating Complex Ideas in Academic Discourse

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2024/05/blog-post_20.html

Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Corrected Edition. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Copyright © 1974, 1976, 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gaston, Sean, and Ian Maclachlan, eds. Reading Derrida's "Of Grammatology". London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011.

García Morente, Manuel. La Filosofía de Kant: Una Introducción a la Filosofía. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A., 1917. Colección Austral.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. University of Pennsylvania and Yale University. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Gardner, Sebastian. Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. First published 1999. Abingdon: Routledge, 1999.