The Risks of Unclear Terminology in Academic Language: A Comparative Analysis of Saussure, Peirce, and Derrida

Abstract

This article explores the distinctions and connections between natural languages and academic jargon, examining how philosophers like Saussure, Peirce, and Derrida have approached the creation and definition of terminology in their works. While Saussure and Peirce established conventional bonds with their readers through clear definitions, Derrida intentionally avoided doing so as part of his deconstructive strategy. This decision, while philosophically motivated, has led to significant interpretive challenges. A key example is Derrida's use of the word “writing,” which was redefined without explanation, causing confusion among listeners who took it in the literal sense of its ordinary use. The article discusses the implications of this approach, suggesting that a lack of clear definitions can hinder understanding, as observers may interpret philosophical terms based on their everyday meanings. The article concludes by proposing a more balanced approach to technicisms, emphasizing the need for provisional definitions that can guide readers while still allowing for interpretive flexibility.

Introduction

Language in philosophy and academia presents a unique tension between two systems: ordinary use of words and academic jargon. The first, as Saussure suggests, is an inherited network of signs that evolves organically over generations, eluding individual control. It shapes our everyday communication and is learned unconsciously, becoming second nature. In contrast, technical vocabulary is intentionally crafted by thinkers who define new concepts to articulate specialized ideas. Unlike the unconscious acquisition of natural language, the terminology in academic discourse involves a deliberate "baptism" of expressions, forming a conscious bond between author and pursuer. This article argues that while avoiding fixed definitions, as Derrida does, can foster interpretive fluidity, it also risks alienating readers. The lack of clear definitions makes it difficult for followers to distinguish between the ordinary sense of words and the nuanced, second-order meanings within scholarly contexts. Consequently, this can lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations, undermining the purpose of philosophical writing, which is to communicate complex ideas effectively.

Section 1: Natural Language vs. Academic Jargon

Natural language is an inherited, organic system of signs, acquired unconsciously and passed down through generations. It is characterized by its arbitrariness and is shaped by social conventions beyond individual control. Saussure famously highlighted this aspect, arguing that it "eludes the control of our will," and illustrated the distinction between the signifier (sound pattern) and signified (concept), emphasizing that their connection is arbitrary and socially constructed. In contrast, academic jargon is a consciously created, evolving set of specialized locutions. Philosophers like Saussure and Peirce deliberately coined new terminology, such as "signifier," "signified," and Peirce's "icon," "index," and "symbol," to express complex ideas with precision. This deliberate creation, or "baptism," of terms forms a conventional bond with the reader, guiding their interpretation and helping them comprehend concepts that go beyond the everyday meanings of words. By clearly defining their terms, these thinkers provide an entry point into their theories, reducing ambiguity and facilitating deeper engagement with their work.

Section 2: Saussure and Peirce: Establishing Conventions

Ferdinand de Saussure introduced a foundational semiotic framework with clear, well-defined terminology. He distinguished between the signifier (the sound pattern) and the signified (the concept), together forming the sign. By offering precise definitions, Saussure created a conventional bond with his disciples, guiding them through his analysis of language as a system of arbitrary signs. This clarity facilitated awareness, allowing the audience to differentiate between everyday meanings and the specialized definitions within his linguistic theory. Similarly, Charles Sanders Peirce developed a typology of signs, classifying them into icons, indices, and symbols. Peirce’s explicit definitions—icons resembling their referents, indices being physically and causally connected, and symbols relying on convention—provided readers with a clear gateway into his semiotic framework. These distinctions helped others grasp the different ways in which signs function, making complex ideas more accessible. Both Saussure and Peirce’s commitment to defining their terms ensured that their theoretical concepts were understood as intended, reducing ambiguity and fostering effective communication with their audience.

Section 3: Academic Language as a Second-Order Semiotic System

Academic language functions as a second-order semiotic system, building on natural linguistic expression but introducing specialized rules and connotations. Roland Barthes described similar second-order systems in his analysis of myth, where common signs are reinterpreted with additional layers of significance. Specific terminology repurposes everyday discourse, giving ordinary words new, context-specific definitions within a specialized discourse. For example, in literary analysis, devices like metaphor and synecdoche illustrate this second-order usage. When Shakespeare writes “eternal summer,” the literal sense is overridden by a metaphorical one, signifying timeless beauty. Similarly, philosophical terms often carry, messages distinct from their everyday usage. A concept like “writing” in Derrida’s philosophy, for instance, does not refer merely to written text but to a broader concept of inscription and difference. By creating a second-order system, academic discourse demands additional knowledge beyond the mother tongue, requiring readers to understand specialized meanings that diverge from conventional interpretations. This creates a distinct interpretive framework that is essential for engaging with scholarly texts.

Section 4: Derrida’s Deconstructive Strategy and the Risks of Ambiguity

Derrida deliberately avoided providing fixed definitions for key terms such as "writing," "trace," "différance," and "supplementarity." This choice was central to his strategy of challenging logocentrism and disrupting the metaphysics of presence. By resisting definitions, Derrida sought to maintain interpretive fluidity, preventing readers from settling into fixed meanings and encouraging an ongoing process of questioning and reinterpretation. His use of varied phraseology aimed to destabilize conventional readings, promoting a dynamic engagement with his texts.

A notable example is Derrida’s use of the term "writing." Many individuals mistakenly interpreted it according to its everyday use, assuming it referred to the physical act of writing or written text. However, Derrida redefined "writing" as an abstract process of inscription and differentiation, a concept that he argued was prior to and foundational for speech itself. This broader, second-order interpretation required knowledge beyond the basic understanding of natural language, which many readers lacked, making it difficult for them to grasp the specialized framework of Derrida’s philosophy.

The absence of explicit definitions poses a risk: without clear guidance, engagers may default to their natural language understanding, missing the nuanced, specialized meanings Derrida intended. This lack of orientation can alienate readers, hindering their ability to fully engage with and interpret his philosophical project.

Section 5: The Balance Between Fluidity and Clarity

While Derrida’s strategy of avoiding fixed definitions promotes interpretive flexibility, it can also alienate thinkers who struggle to grasp his concepts. To address this, a middle ground is needed where provisional definitions offer a starting point without restricting reinterpretation. By providing tentative explanations, philosophers can guide readers into the specialized terminology of their work, offering a framework that facilitates understanding while still allowing for evolving interpretations.

Provisional definitions serve as an access route, aligning with the deconstructive emphasis on context and iterability. They do not fix meaning permanently but offer a scaffold that others can use as they engage with the text. These definitions embody Aristotelian potentiality, providing a latent structure that can be actualized in specific contexts. In this sense, provisional definitions transition from mere potential to actuality as the context renders their meaning more precise and fully realized.

Moreover, this approach resonates with Saussure’s distinction between meaning and value. While provisional definitions provide an initial meaning, their true value is determined by the context in which they are employed. Saussurean value underscores that the significance of a term depends not only on what it denotes but also on its relation to other terms within a system. Similarly, potential definitions acquire sharper clarity and richer interpretive dimensions as they interact with their contextual surroundings, allowing for a dynamic refinement of meaning.

By embracing this dual emphasis on potentiality and contextual value, academics can balance the fluidity of signs with the need for orientation. Provisional definitions serve as flexible yet grounded starting points, fostering engagement while respecting the evolving and relational nature of philosophical inquiry. This approach ensures that complex theories remain accessible without diminishing their depth or nuance.

Conclusion

This article has explored the distinction between natural language, which is inherited and unconsciously acquired, and academic jargon, which is intentionally crafted by thinkers like Saussure and Peirce. These philosophers established conventional bonds with their students by defining their nomenclature, providing clarity and facilitating comprehension. In contrast, Derrida’s refusal to provide fixed definitions was a deliberate strategy aimed at disrupting traditional logocentrism and promoting interpretive fluidity. However, this approach often led to misunderstandings, as readers interpreted terms like “writing” in their conventional, first-order sense rather than grasping Derrida’s abstract redefinition, which encompasses a broader concept of inscription and the deferral of meaning.

The creation of a second-order system in intellectual language requires readers to possess knowledge beyond that of their mother tongue, engaging with specialized definitions that diverge from everyday interpretations. While destabilizing fixed meanings can enrich philosophical inquiry, offering an entry point through provisional definitions is essential for effective communication.

Ultimately, philosophers and academics have a responsibility to bridge the gap between their specialized vocabulary and the everyday speech of their audience, balancing depth with accessibility to foster dialogue and understanding in the broader intellectual community.

Bibliography

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger. Libraire Payot.

Culler, Jonathan. 1976. SAUSSURE. Fontana/Collins.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1894. "What Is a Sign?" Accessed September 8, 2024. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Corrected Edition. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Copyright © 1974, 1976, 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gaston, Sean, and Ian Maclachlan, eds. Reading Derrida's "Of Grammatology". London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011.