The Dual Nature of "Symbol" in Peirce’s Semiotics: Resolving Interpretative Challenges

 

Abstract

Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotics reveals a nuanced duality in the term "symbol." It signifies both a type of sign rooted in social conventions and the synthesized product of reasoning that integrates icons, indices, and symbols. Misinterpretation of this dual use, as in the case of Derrida’s idiosyncratic reading of the phrase “Omne symbolum de symbolo” in Of Grammatology, risks undermining Peirce’s conceptual clarity. This article explores the distinctions, situating them within Peirce’s triadic framework and contextualizing them with Saussurean insights. It emphasizes the importance of precise terminology to avoid philosophical misunderstandings, showcasing the complexity and intellectual richness of Peirce’s thought.

Introduction

Understanding Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of signs is crucial for grasping the foundations of reasoning and the creation of meaning. Within his semiotic framework, symbols play a pivotal role, serving as tools for abstract thought and communication. However, the term "symbol" has sparked considerable debate among scholars due to its dual interpretation in Peirce’s writings, often leading to confusion. This article seeks to resolve this ambiguity by carefully unpacking the nuanced distinctions Peirce makes.

The discussion begins by presenting Peirce’s core ideas, specifically the Three States of Mind and the Three Types of Signs, and their interrelation. It then delves into how reasoning, as Peirce described, involves orchestrating these signs to uncover truth. The central focus, however, is clarifying the two distinct uses of "symbol" within Peirce’s system, enriched by a Saussurean perspective, and resolving common misunderstandings surrounding the phrase "Omne symbolum de symbolo."

1. The Three States of Mind and the Three Types of Signs

Peirce identifies three mental states: Feeling, which involves direct experience; Reaction, characterized by interactions with external forces; and Thinking, where patterns and rules are discerned. These align with his categorization of signs: Icons, which resemble their objects (e.g., photographs); Indices, directly linked to their referents (e.g., smoke indicating fire); and Symbols, which represent through convention (e.g., words).

These elements form a progression. Feeling corresponds to icons, where resemblance dominates. Reaction relates to indices, with their causal connections. Thinking aligns with symbols, emphasizing abstraction and generalization.

Their interplay is evident in examples like a stop sign, which combines the iconic shape of an octagon (Feeling), its placement at intersections as an index (Reaction), and the word "STOP" as a symbolic instruction (Thinking). This interconnectedness supports Peirce’s assertion that reasoning involves marshalling these signs to discern deeper truths about reality.

2. Reasoning as Marshalling Signs

Peirce's description of reasoning as "the art of marshalling signs" reveals its dynamic and integrative nature. It entails skillfully combining and interpreting different types of signs—icons, indices, and symbols—to navigate complex ideas and discover truths.

Consider the investigative work of Sherlock Holmes. Icons appear when Holmes examines visual clues like sketches or reconstructs the crime scene in his mind, visualizing events to understand what might have happened. Indices, such as footprints or fingerprints, provide direct physical links to the case, grounding his deductions in observable evidence. Symbols emerge as Holmes interprets testimonies, deciphers messages, and synthesizes these elements using language and logic.

This seamless integration of icons, indices, and symbols demonstrates how reasoning relies heavily on symbolic processes. Symbols, encapsulating abstract and generalized concepts, enable the mind to synthesize diverse signs into cohesive conclusions. This reliance forms the foundation for exploring the dual meaning of "symbol," both as a type of sign and as the outcome of reasoning itself, which will be explored further in the article.

3. The Dual Use of "Symbol"

Peirce employs the term "symbol" in two distinct senses within his semiotic theory. First, a symbol is a type of sign, defined by its reliance on social conventions and shared understanding. Unlike icons, which resemble their objects, or indices, which are causally connected, symbols derive meaning from established agreements. For example, the word “tree” symbolizes the concept of a tree because speakers of a language collectively associate the term with the idea, regardless of any direct resemblance or physical connection:  

“Any ordinary word, as give, bird, marriage, is an example of a symbol” (Peirce,1894).

Second, Peirce uses "symbol" to describe the outcome of reasoning, which integrates icons, indices, and symbols into a unified interpretation. This symbolic result emerges through the synthesis of diverse signs:

“In all reasoning, we have to use a mixture of likenesses, indices, and symbols. We cannot dispense with any of them. The complex whole may be called a symbol; for its symbolic, living character is the prevailing one” (Peirce,1894).

 For instance, a scientist interpreting data from images, measurements, and theoretical models produces a conclusion that can be called a symbolic understanding.

This duality aligns with Saussure’s insight that a word’s identity depends on its relational context, not its inherent features:“Every time I utter the word Messieurs (‘Gentlemen’), I renew its material being: it is a new act of phonation and a new psychological act. The link between two uses of the same word is not based upon material identity, nor upon exact similarity of meaning, but upon factors the linguist must discover, if he is to come anywhere near to revealing the true nature of linguistic units.” [CGL] [152]. In Peirce’s framework, "symbol" takes on different referents depending on its role. As a type of sign, it operates within the triadic system alongside icons and indices. As the result of reasoning, it signifies the dynamic, living integration of signs into meaningful conclusions, shaped by context and application in objective reality.

4. Resolving the Confusion in "Omne symbolum de symbolo"

In the phrase “Symbols grow. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo,” Peirce specifically refers to symbol as a type of sign within his triadic system. Symbols, such as words or mathematical expressions, evolve through reinterpretation and cultural refinement. However, this technical use of "symbol" should not be conflated with the broader, metaphorical sense of "symbol" as the outcome of reasoning.

Misinterpretations have arisen, including Derrida’s partial quotation of Peirce in Of Grammatology, where "symbol" is discussed without fully distinguishing its dual meanings: “Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs (the sentence in truncated, it continues like this: partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols”). But these roots must not compromise the structural originality of the field of symbols, the autonomy of a domain, a production, and a play: "So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo.” (O.G, p 48). While symbols as signs grow out of existing symbols (e.g., new words emerge from older terms), symbols as reasoning results emerge from engaging with reality through icons, indices, and symbols collectively.

Failing to differentiate these meanings undermines Peirce’s semiotic precision. Recognizing this distinction is crucial: symbols as signs (e.g., words, formulas) evolve within a structured framework, whereas reasoning results (symbolic syntheses) arise from interpreting the interplay of diverse signs and their relation to the world. This nuanced understanding preserves the coherence of Peirce’s thought and avoids conflating separate semiotic processes.

Conclusion

Peirce’s semiotics intertwines the Three States of Mind—Feeling, Reaction, and Thinking—with the Three Types of Signs—Icons, Indices, and Symbols—forming a foundational framework for reasoning. The term “symbol” carries dual significance in his theory. It represents both a specific category of sign defined by conventions and a broader conceptual outcome of reasoning that synthesizes various signs into unified interpretations. Careful contextual reading resolves this ambiguity, avoiding conflation of these meanings.

The phrase “Omne symbolum de symbolo” refers specifically to symbols as a type of sign, underscoring their evolution from existing conventions like words or formulas. Misunderstanding this can distort Peirce’s insights.

By clarifying such subtleties, we appreciate the depth of Peirce’s philosophy, which demands precision for effective application in semiotics, reasoning, and communication. This exploration highlights the intricate interplay between signs, thought processes, and their evolving interpretations.

Bibliography

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1894. "What Is a Sign?" Accessed September 8, 2024. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Corrected Edition. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Copyright © 1974, 1976, 1997 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger. Libraire Payot.