From Mirrors to Games: Wittgenstein’s Two Philosophies of Language

Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical trajectory represents one of the most profound transformations in modern thought. His early work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and his later text, Philosophical Investigations, offer contrasting visions of how language functions and how philosophical problems arise. Central to this divergence is the shift from the picture theory of language to the concept of language games. The former views language as a representational system bound by logical form, while the latter understands language as a socially embedded practice shaped by usage. This essay explores this contrast as the primary axis of Wittgenstein’s philosophical evolution. While other significant concepts—such as rule-following, private language, and the role of philosophy—will be briefly considered to deepen the analysis, the focus remains on the opposition between static representation and dynamic practice. Wittgenstein’s move from the logical rigidity of the Tractatus to the open-ended multiplicity of language games in the Investigations reveals not just a new linguistic theory, but a reimagined understanding of human life and meaning.

I. The Picture Theory of Language

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein posits that “a proposition is a picture of reality.”¹ Language, he argues, functions by depicting possible states of affairs through logical form, which is shared between a proposition and the reality it represents. Just as a map mirrors spatial relations, a sentence mirrors logical ones.² Logical form, though unspoken and unseen, ensures that language can correspond to the world. This mirroring constitutes meaning: a sentence is meaningful when it represents a possible fact.

This picture theory implies that language has a fixed, ideal structure, and that what can be said meaningfully must follow the laws of logic. Consequently, much of traditional philosophy—ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics—is dismissed as nonsensical. “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,” Wittgenstein famously concludes.³ Rules, in this system, are embedded in logical syntax rather than in human action. Philosophy’s role is merely to display the boundaries of sense, not to engage with ordinary linguistic practices. It is a form of clarification, not of explanation.

II. Language Games and the Later Philosophy

Wittgenstein’s later philosophy abandons the quest for a single essence of language. In Philosophical Investigations, he famously declares, “For a large class of cases… the meaning of a word is its use in the language.”⁴ Language is no longer viewed as a mirror of reality but as a tool used in diverse social practices. Wittgenstein introduces the notion of language games to capture this multiplicity: asking, thanking, commanding, and joking all constitute distinct, rule-governed practices with their own internal logic.⁵ There is no longer a universal logical form, but rather overlapping family resemblances among different uses of words.

This framework redefines what it means to follow a rule. Instead of a logical necessity, rule-following is a social activity rooted in communal agreement.⁶ The infamous private language argument builds on this: language depends on shared criteria for meaningfulness; a truly private language, known only to an individual, is incoherent.⁷ Philosophy, under this view, becomes therapeutic: it seeks not to construct theories but to “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”⁸ It is an activity of disentanglement, not of system-building.

III. Continuities and Breaks: From Logic to Life

Despite the radical change in method and tone, both phases of Wittgenstein’s thought share a concern with the limits of sense. In the Tractatus, these limits are drawn by logic; in the Investigations, they are set by human practice. Rule-following illustrates this shift. Early Wittgenstein sees rules as structurally embedded in propositions; later, he sees them as enacted by users of language.⁹ The later focus on forms of life—the shared background of human behavior that grounds linguistic understanding—further distances the Investigations from the atomistic idealism of the Tractatus.

Even the role of philosophy transforms. The early view sees philosophy as an activity of logical clarification: it shows what can be said and what cannot. The later view sees philosophy as dissolving confusions caused by the misuse of language. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language,” Wittgenstein writes.¹⁰ This move from an abstract metaphysical system to a grounded investigation of language use marks not only a change in doctrine, but a change in the very nature of philosophical inquiry.

Conclusion

The transition from picture theory to language games encapsulates Wittgenstein’s philosophical revolution. In his early phase, meaning is determined by a structural correspondence between language and the world; in his later work, meaning emerges from shared human practices. While both periods are animated by the desire to define the limits of sense and resist metaphysical confusion, the path taken differs dramatically. The Tractatus enforces logical purity; the Investigations embraces linguistic plurality. Alongside this shift comes a reevaluation of rules, grammar, and the public nature of meaning. Far from a mere rejection of his earlier work, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy can be seen as a maturation—a return to philosophical problems not with certainty, but with humility. By exchanging the rigidity of representation for the richness of use, Wittgenstein reframes language not as a mirror of the world, but as a medium of life itself.

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Bibliography

Primary Works

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.

———. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922.

Secondary Literature

Baker, Gordon P., and P. M. S. Hacker. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, vol. 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.

Diamond, Cora. “Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus.” Philosophy 63, no. 240 (1988): 5–27.

Kenny, Anthony. Wittgenstein. Rev. ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Penguin, 1990.

Sluga, Hans. Wittgenstein. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Footnotes

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 1922), 4.01.
2. Ibid., 2.1–2.2.
3. Ibid., 7.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §43.
5. Ibid., §23.
6. Ibid., §§198–202.
7. Ibid., §§243–272.
8. Ibid., §116.
9. Ibid., §§201–202.
10. Ibid., §109.