Are We Algorithms? A Critical Response to Yuval Noah Harari’s Homo Deus

INTRODUCTION

Yuval Noah Harari’s Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow presents a bold, sweeping narrative about the future of humanity. In his widely viewed public lecture promoting the book¹, Harari claims that liberal humanism—with its emphasis on free will and subjective experience—is being replaced by a new worldview grounded in data science and artificial intelligence. Central to his thesis is the assertion that “organisms are algorithms”—that human feelings, decisions, and even consciousness can be reduced to computational processes.

Such claims are delivered with rhetorical clarity, but they raise significant philosophical and scientific concerns. Harari draws on contemporary science to support deterministic conclusions about life, thought, and agency. Yet his appeal to “science” often blurs the lines between speculative extrapolation and established fact. This article aims to unpack and interrogate the key claims Harari puts forward, including his reduction of emotion to algorithm, his dichotomy between “outdated” and “correct” science, and his framing of humanism as a superseded myth. By examining the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind these arguments, we will see that what appears to be a coherent vision of the future conceals a number of unresolved contradictions.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY “ORGANISMS ARE ALGORITMS”?

At the core of Harari’s thesis lies a striking assertion:

“In just three words: organisms are algorithms”².

This functions as both a summary of his worldview and a conceptual reduction that underpins the logic of Homo Deus. He extends this further, arguing that:

“According to current scientific theories, feelings are in fact biochemical algorithms”³.

To understand the implications, we must first clarify what Harari means by “algorithm.” Originally, the term comes from mathematics and computer science, referring to a clearly defined set of step-by-step instructions for solving problems. Describing emotions as algorithms translates deeply embodied, context-dependent experiences into abstract, programmable routines. While this analogy may serve rhetorical purposes, it lacks scientific precision and philosophical depth.

Neuroscience and cognitive science certainly investigate information-processing in the brain, and some models simulate certain aspects of emotional response. However, reducing all subjective experience to algorithmic computation overlooks fundamental philosophical distinctions—such as the difference between syntax and semantics, or mechanical operation and conscious meaning. The notorious “hard problem of consciousness” points to what philosophers call qualia: the subjective “what it is like” aspect of experience, which resists being fully captured by computational accounts.

Noam Chomsky, among others, has warned against extending computational metaphors beyond their domain. In his lectures on language and mind, Chomsky stresses that models or simulations should never be mistaken for explanations⁴. Feelings may appear predictable in certain contexts, but this does not prove they are algorithmic in essence. Harari’s formulation risks collapsing metaphor into ontology, which has significant consequences for how we understand human nature.

SCIENCE AS AN AUTHORITY: A NUANCED PERSPECTIVE

Throughout his talk, Harari draws a sharp line between “good” and “bad” science, positioning his thesis as aligned with the most advanced and reliable discoveries. He claims, for example:

“This entire story of humanism is really based on outdated science”⁵,

while asserting that today’s best researchers confirm the algorithmic nature of living beings:

“Now, the best scientists in the world are telling us that… organisms are algorithms” ⁶.

Such appeals to “current science” serve as rhetorical appeals to objective truth. Yet Harari’s usage of “science” is itself problematic. Science is not a monolithic domain but a diverse collection of disciplines—neuroscience, psychology, genetics, philosophy—often harboring competing paradigms. Debates about whether consciousness can be reduced to neural computation remain unresolved.

By presenting his vision as the inevitable conclusion of contemporary research, Harari obscures this pluralism. His stance resembles what Thomas Kuhn described as paradigm entrenchment⁷: privileging one worldview while dismissing others without adequately addressing their complexity or empirical challenges.

Moreover, Harari’s distinction between “outdated” and “updated” science reflects a technological notion of progress. It suggests that ideas about freedom, agency, and human dignity are relics of superseded knowledge. But such philosophical concepts are not falsified by scientific discovery; rather, they are reinterpreted, revalued, or preserved for their normative importance.

When Harari invokes “the best scientists,” he appeals more to authority than consensus. This risks turning science into a legitimizing discourse that justifies sweeping claims—such as the obsolescence of humanism—rather than a critical, revisable inquiry.

It is worth noting that many contemporary scientists and philosophers explicitly reject reductionism and endorse pluralistic models that integrate computational, embodied, and phenomenological approaches. Harari’s narrative thus does not fully engage with ongoing scientific complexity.

HUMANISM AND ITS ALLEGED “OBSOLESCENCE”

Another key theme in Harari’s lecture is the purported decline of humanism. He portrays liberal ideology—with its emphasis on individual autonomy and moral intuition—as a narrative based on “wrong assumptions about the human organism”⁸, giving way to dataism, a new ideology that shifts authority from human feelings to algorithmic decision-making:

“Humanism is now being replaced by dataism” ⁹.

This framing is both historical and deterministic. Humanism is cast as a once-useful myth, now superseded by superior knowledge. However, this perspective treats moral and philosophical traditions as mere technological artifacts. Humanism is more than a “story”; it is a normative commitment to the dignity and value of individual experience.

Harari’s narrative implies that values must yield to facts and that sentiment has no place in a data-driven world. Yet humanism—from Renaissance thinkers like Pico della Mirandola to contemporary philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum—has engaged critically with science while resisting reductive accounts.

Besides, the binary between humanism and dataism oversimplifies both. It falsely assumes technological advancement must erode moral autonomy, and that information systems can fully replace ethical reasoning. The supposed “end of humanism” appears less as scientific inevitability than a narrative choice—one that forecloses alternative futures.

In fact, many scholars advocate for hybrid frameworks that integrate humanistic values with technological development, emphasizing ethical design, human-centered AI, and the ongoing relevance of moral reflection in digital society.

THE METAPHYSICS OF DATAISM: A CAUTIONARY TALE

Harari’s vision culminates in dataism, where data flows and pattern recognition supplant human judgment. He asks:

“What will happen to society, to politics, to daily life when non-conscious but highly intelligent algorithms know us better than we know ourselves?” ¹⁰.

This shifts the discussion from description to metaphysics. Dataism becomes a worldview interpreting existence itself. The claim that machines can “know” us better than we do presupposes that knowing is reducible to prediction and correlation.

But is there a meaningful difference between recognizing a pattern and truly understanding a person? Can statistical inference replace introspection, empathy, or reflection? Equating predictive capacity with self-knowledge redefines knowing in purely external, behaviorist terms.

This metaphysics reifies systems once designed as analytic tools, transforming epistemological methods into ontological statements: we are what can be measured. This recalls Heidegger’s warning against “enframing”—reducing beings to resources in a technological order¹¹.

Even if algorithms surpass humans in certain domains, it does not justify declaring consciousness, meaning, or moral deliberation obsolete. The replacement of humanism with dataism is not a scientific necessity but a philosophical wager—one that demands deeper reflection than Harari provides.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A SCIENCE THAT HONORS HUMANITY

Yuval Noah Harari’s Homo Deus lecture offers a compelling vision of a data-driven future. His central claims—that organisms are algorithms, feelings are biochemical processes, and humanism is outdated—challenge us to reconsider our assumptions. Yet these claims rest on conceptual leaps that merit careful scrutiny.

By conflating metaphor with mechanism and invoking “science” as an unassailable authority, Harari advances a narrative that is rhetorically persuasive but philosophically fragile. His portrayal of humanism as a discarded myth and dataism as its inevitable successor overlooks the complexity and resilience of both traditions.

The pressing question is not whether algorithms will reshape society—they already do—but whether reductive models should dictate the terms of our humanity. A more urgent task is to imagine and develop scientific and philosophical approaches that do not eclipse the very beings they seek to understand, but rather respect the irreducible richness of human experience, agency, and ethical responsibility.

NOTES

¹ Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, YouTube lecture. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ChHc5jhZxs&t=1486s
² Ibid., at 24:46.
³ Ibid., at 25:01.
⁴ Noam Chomsky, The Secrets of Words (MIT Lecture Series), 2021.
⁵ Harari, Homo Deus lecture, at 21:32.
⁶ Ibid., at 24:55.
⁷ Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962.
⁸ Harari, Homo Deus lecture, at 21:30.
⁹ Ibid., at 1:01:42.
¹⁰ Ibid., at 1:01:55.
¹¹ Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 1954.