Bypassing Metaphysics: Turing and Saussure’s Rejection of Essence and Origin

Introduction

For over seventy years, Alan Turing’s test for machine intelligence has stood as a landmark in artificial intelligence. Rather than ask “Can machines think?”, Turing famously sidestepped the metaphysical terrain altogether. In doing so, he wasn’t alone. Ferdinand de Saussure, in his Course in General Linguistics, likewise refused to consider the origins or essence of language, insisting instead on its relational character. These parallel gestures—one in computer science, the other in linguistics—signal a shared resistance to metaphysical speculation. Instead, both thinkers propose a rigorously defined, observable approach to their subjects, aligning with a broader positivist epistemology that shaped 20th-century thought.

Turing and the Pragmatics of Intelligence

In his 1950 essay “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Turing begins by announcing the inadequacy of traditional philosophical approaches:

“I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ This should begin with definitions... but this attitude is dangerous... Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another...” (Turing, 1950)

The “other question” is the Imitation Game: if a machine can carry on a written conversation indistinguishable from a human’s, it passes the test. Here, intelligence is treated not as an inner essence but as a functionally defined behavior, observable in performance. This operational definition allows Turing to avoid entrenched metaphysical questions about the nature of thought, consciousness, or the soul.

Turing’s strategy reflects the influence of logical positivism, especially the Vienna Circle and thinkers like A.J. Ayer. According to this school of thought, questions are only meaningful if they are either analytically true or empirically verifiable. Anything else—including metaphysical musings about mind or language—was dismissed as nonsensical.

Saussure and the Scientific Study of Language

In a similar vein, Saussure revolutionized the study of language by detaching it from the traditional concern with origins. In Course in General Linguistics, he writes:

“At any given period, however far back in time we go, a language is always an inheritance from the past. The initial assignment of names to things, establishing a contract between concepts and sound patterns, is an act we can conceive in the imagination, but no one has ever observed it taking place. In fact, no society has ever known its language to be anything other than something inherited from previous generations, which it has no choice but to accept. That is why the question of the origins of language does not have the importance generally attributed to it. It is not even a relevant question as far as linguistics is concerned. The sole object of study in linguistics is the normal, regular existence of a language already established.” (Saussure, CGL, p. 71)

Rather than trace the historical development of language (diachrony), Saussure urges linguists to focus on the language system as it exists at a given moment (synchrony). He defines language (langue) as a system of differences without positive terms—relations, not substances. Like Turing, Saussure turns away from speculation about the origin of language and focuses instead on how it functions.

As Roy Harris explains, Saussure’s ambition was to put linguistics on a scientific footing:

“His model for linguistics was not philosophy or philology, but mathematics and physics.” (Harris, Saussure and His Interpreters, 1987)

This scientific reorientation necessitated the abandonment of metaphysical questions about essence or origin.

From Comte to Computation: The Positivist Backdrop

Both Turing and Saussure inherit a broader intellectual tradition shaped by positivism. Auguste Comte, the founder of this movement, argued that human knowledge evolves from theological to metaphysical and finally to scientific stages. The scientific stage is characterized by a refusal to inquire into first causes or hidden essences—only observable regularities matter.

In the 20th century, this view was refined by logical empiricism, which treated metaphysical statements as meaningless. John Haugeland, commenting on Turing, notes:

“The real importance of the Turing Test lies not in what it tells us about machines, but in what it tells us about what counts as an acceptable question.” (AI: The Very Idea, 1985)

Turing’s redefinition of the question “Can machines think?” is not a tactical move—it is a philosophical stance. Likewise, Saussure’s refusal to engage with the origin of signs is not a gap in his theory but its foundational gesture.

A Shared Epistemological Strategy

What unites Turing and Saussure is a deliberate strategy of bracketing metaphysics. They do not attempt to explain what mind or language is in some essential or ultimate sense. Instead, they replace such questions with formal, observable, and operational substitutes.

Turing offers imitation; Saussure offers system. Both are interested in how things function, not in what they essentially are.

This is not a failure of imagination, but a conscious move that redefines the terms of inquiry. As one might put it: they do not solve the metaphysical problems—they dissolve them.

Conclusion

The legacies of Turing and Saussure mark a turning point in modern intellectual history. By rejecting metaphysical speculation and substituting formal, observable models, they helped inaugurate the structural, computational, and behavioral sciences of the 20th century. Their posture—scientific, anti-metaphysical, formal—remains foundational not only in linguistics and artificial intelligence but in how we define legitimate knowledge today. In the age of AI and big data, their strategic avoidance of metaphysics seems not outdated but prescient.

References

1. Turing, A. M. (1950). “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Mind, 59(236), 433–460.
2. Saussure, F. de. (1916). Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Bally and Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin.
3. Harris, R. (1987). Saussure and His Interpreters. Edinburgh University Press.
4. Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. MIT Press.
5. Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz.
6. Comte, A. (1830). Cours de philosophie positive.