Destinies and Substitutions: Re-reading Nomen est omen and Aliquid stat pro aliquo through Derrida

Logos Disintegrates into Morphs. AI art

 

“The signified is never present in itself.” —Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976/1967, p. 49)

Introduction

Western thought harbors two compact Latin proverbs that still steer how we imagine language. Nomen est omen (“the name is an omen”) implies that words expose the inner nature or fate of what they label. Aliquid stat pro aliquo (“something stands for something else”) offers a seemingly modest definition of the sign as substitution. This essay argues that both formulas, although often quoted as commonsense wisdom, rest on profound metaphysical commitments that Jacques Derrida dismantles in Of Grammatology (1976/1967). By tracing their origins and staging a dialogue with Derrida, we will see that destiny and substitution alike enlist a hidden faith in presence that contemporary semiotics can no longer sustain.

1 Classical Formulations

1.1 Name as Destiny

In Plautus’ Persa a wily slave praises a courtesan named Lucris (“profit”): “Nomen atque omen quantivis iam est preti” (Plautus, trans. 1912, l. 409). Erasmus resurrected the line in his Adagia (1515/1965), and ever since journalists have delighted in aptronyms like Usain Bolt or Amy Freeze. Beneath the wit lies an essentialist conviction: the sign and the essence coincide; meaning resides inside the word, waiting to reveal itself.

1.2 Sign as Stand‑In

Medieval logicians such as Peter of Spain coined aliquid stat pro aliquo to explain how terms function inside propositions. The maxim migrated into modern semiotics when Charles S. Peirce (1931) redefined a sign as “something which stands to somebody for something.” Here the link between expression and content is representational, not essential. Yet even this looser bond still imagines a two‑part entity: sensible signifier + intelligible signified.

2 Derrida’s Deconstruction of Substitution

Early in Of Grammatology Derrida targets the tranquil face of aliquid stat pro aliquo. For him, the medieval binary repeats the Stoic–Christian hierarchy of body and soul, appearance and essence (Derrida, 1976/1967, pp. 11‑12). Accepting a sign that merely “stands for” something else means smuggling in three assumptions:

a. Bipartition: A sign is naturally twofold.
b. Prior Signified: The concept exists before its inscription.
c. Transparent Mediation: Language simply ferries meaning from mind to world.

 Each premise sustains a logocentric dream of immediacy—a pure logos present to itself, historically coded as the Word of God. Derrida counters that signifiers never arrive at such purity; every supposed concept is already encased in further traces. Meaning circulates through différance, a perpetual deferral where presence is only ever promised, never delivered.

3 Applying the Critique to Fate‑bound Names

If aliquid stat pro aliquo still depends on a concealed ground, nomen est omen magnifies the problem. The destiny proverb leaps from representation to identity: word and thing share substance. Within Derrida’s framework, this is the ultimate metaphysical fantasy—language not just mirroring but embodying essence. It denies Saussure’s (1916/1983) insight that the sign is arbitrary, that only systemic difference endows a term with value. Thus, the prophecy in the name hinges on what Derrida would label a transcendental signified: an origin outside time that confers truth on the surface inscription.

4 Implications for Semiotic Theory and Practice

Recognizing these hidden loyalties reshapes several fields:

a. Structural Linguistics: Although Saussure breaks with Cratylism and treats the sign as a mental entity, his own bipartite model still echoes aliquid stat pro aliquo and thus keeps traces of presence alive (Harris, 1987).
b. Brand Strategy: Marketers rely on phonoaesthetic cues (“Jaguar,” “Rolex”) that hint at innate appeal, effectively reviving nomen est omen for commercial aims.
c. Cognitive Psychology: Research on “implicit egotism” (Pelham et al., 2002) finds small biases toward name-like stimuli; yet these effects remain probabilistic, not fated.

In each case, Derrida’s lesson urges caution: whenever communication appears transparent, metaphysics is working overtime.

Conclusion

The twin adages nomen est omen and aliquid stat pro aliquo compress entire ontologies of language—one essentialist, the other representational. Derrida shows that both rely on the fantasy of a signified that pre‑exists expression. Once that guarantor dissolves, destiny shrinks to coincidence and substitution becomes a chain with no final anchor. Therefore, names and signs should not be treated as windows onto reality but as sites where meaning perpetually slips, defers, and transforms.

Notes

1. All translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated.
2. Word economy precludes full discussion of différance; see Derrida (1972) for elaboration.

References

Derrida, J. (1972). Margins of Philosophy (A. Bass, Trans.). University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1967)

Erasmus. (1965). Adages: II1‑IV2 (R. A. B. Mynors, Ed.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1515)

Harris, R. (1987). Reading Saussure. Open Court.

Pelham, B. W., Mirenberg, M. C., & Jones, J. T. (2002). Why Susie sells seashells by the seashore: Implicit egotism and major life decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(4), 469‑487. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022‑3514.82.4.469

Peirce, C. S. (1931). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, Eds.). Harvard University Press.

Plautus. (1912). The Persian (H. T. Riley, Trans.). G. Bell.

Saussure, F. de. (1983). Course in general linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Duckworth. (Original work published 1916)