Human Nature and the Illusion of Shared Meaning: Rereading the Chomsky–Foucault Debate

The Debate. AI image

Introduction

The 1971 televised discussion between Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, later published as Human Nature: Justice versus Power, has become one of the most frequently cited philosophical encounters of the late twentieth century. The debate is often presented as a confrontation between biological universalism and historical relativism, or between Enlightenment rationalism and post-structuralist critique. Yet readers and viewers regularly report a lingering dissatisfaction. Despite the clarity and rigor of both speakers, the exchange never quite arrives at a point of resolution.

This article argues that the frustration generated by the debate does not stem from intellectual failure or rhetorical evasion. Rather, it arises from a deeper and largely unexamined assumption: that the same words—human nature, justice, subject—carry the same meaning across theoretical systems. Once this assumption is questioned, the debate appears less as an unresolved disagreement than as a revealing case of conceptual non-alignment.

Human Nature Between Biology and History

Chomsky approaches the question of human nature from the standpoint of cognitive science and linguistics. Drawing on his work on language acquisition, he insists that human beings possess innate mental structures that make creativity, learning, and communication possible. Language, for Chomsky, provides empirical evidence against the idea that the mind is a blank slate.

As he puts it in the debate:

“The conclusion that the child brings a rich and highly structured system to language learning seems to me unavoidable… let’s call it human nature, if you like.”

Human nature, in this sense, names a biological endowment that constrains and enables thought. Although cultures differ, the underlying cognitive architecture remains stable enough to ground claims about universality, including moral judgment.

Foucault, by contrast, resists the appeal to any such foundation. He does not deny that human beings have bodies or brains, but he challenges the philosophical function of “human nature” as an explanatory or normative principle. For him, the concept belongs to a specific historical formation.

He responds:

“The notion of human nature is, in my view, a notion which has been created within our civilization, within our system of knowledge, and which forms part of our class system.”

From this perspective, concepts such as justice or morality cannot be grounded in an essence that precedes social relations. They emerge within networks of power, institutional practices, and historical struggles.

A Dialogue That Does Not Converge

As the discussion unfolds, it becomes clear that neither interlocutor is persuaded by the other. Chomsky presses for some minimal conception of justice that could justify political critique, while Foucault remains skeptical of any universal standard that transcends historical conditions.

At one point, the moderator attempts to reconcile the positions with a striking metaphor, suggesting that the two thinkers resemble miners digging a tunnel from opposite sides of the same mountain. The image acknowledges both proximity and distance: the expectation of a meeting point alongside the recognition that it may never be reached.

The politeness of the exchange only intensifies the sense of impasse. Each response is careful, lucid, and principled, yet the gap remains. The debate ends not with synthesis, but with parallel statements that fail to intersect.

When Shared Words Do Not Share Meaning

The persistent stalemate invites a different kind of explanation. Rather than asking which position is correct, it may be more illuminating to ask whether the participants are, in a strict sense, speaking the same language.

A structural insight, first articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure, proves useful here. Meaning, Saussure argues, does not reside in words themselves but emerges from their position within a system of relations. Concepts derive their value from contrasts, not from intrinsic content. Shared vocabulary, therefore, does not guarantee shared meaning.

Seen from this angle, human nature functions as a homonym in the debate. For Chomsky, the term belongs to a system organized around biology, innateness, and cognitive constraint. For Foucault, it operates within a network defined by power, discourse, and historical production. The word remains the same; its conceptual role does not.

The frustration surrounding the debate thus arises from an implicit belief, shared by the speakers and the audience alike, that philosophical terms retain stable meanings across contexts. Once this belief is suspended, the impasse appears structural rather than accidental.

Conclusion: An Unresolved Debate by Necessity

The Chomsky–Foucault debate endures not because it settles the question of human nature, but because it dramatizes the difficulty of philosophical dialogue across divergent conceptual systems. What appears as disagreement may, at a deeper level, reflect incompatible conditions of meaning.

Rather than a failed conversation, the exchange can be read as a lesson in philosophical translation. It shows how easily shared words create the illusion of shared understanding, and how rarely that illusion survives sustained scrutiny. The debate remains unresolved not because the problem resists thought, but because its terms do not belong to a common language.

References

Chomsky, N., & Foucault, M. (2006). The Chomsky–Foucault debate: On human nature. New York, NY: The New Press.

Saussure, F. de. (2011). Course in general linguistics (W. Baskin, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1916)