Diachrony Misplaced: On Weber’s Assimilation of Saussure to Peirce

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Introduction: A Conceptual Transplant

Samuel Weber’s claim that Charles Sanders Peirce situates “diachrony” at the heart of semiosis performs a striking conceptual maneuver. By translating Peirce’s account of interpretive succession into Saussurean vocabulary, Weber appears to construct a philosophical progression from structural closure to temporal openness. Yet this move is not merely bold, it is structurally unstable. It imports a technical term from Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics into a semiotic framework that neither requires nor sustains it. The result is less a productive synthesis than a distortion of two distinct theoretical architectures.

The difficulty lies not in comparison as such, but in conceptual substitution. “Diachrony” in Saussure names a rigorously delimited analytical category. To redeploy it within Peirce’s system without preserving its methodological function is to evacuate its specificity.

Diachrony in Saussure: Historical Substitution, Not Internal Motion

In the Cours de linguistique générale, Saussure defines diachrony as the study of linguistic transformations across time (Saussure 1916/2011). It concerns phonetic shifts, morphological reconfigurations, and lexical replacement. Crucially, diachrony does not describe movement within a system. It denotes change that produces a new system.

Saussure opposes diachrony to synchrony, the analysis of relations among coexisting elements within an état de langue. The two perspectives are methodologically exclusive. Synchrony examines structural coexistence; diachrony examines succession. The latter interrupts equilibrium rather than unfolding within it.

Therefore, diachrony is not temporal process in general. It is historical mutation resulting in systemic displacement. Any attempt to equate this notion with Peirce’s theory of semiosis must confront that restriction. Weber does not.

Peirce’s Semiosis: Logical Succession, Not Historical Replacement

Peirce’s semiotic doctrine centers on the triadic relation of sign, object, and interpretant (Peirce 1931–35). Each sign generates an interpretant; that interpretant functions as a new sign, producing further interpretation. This chain may continue indefinitely. Peirce famously maintains that “every thought must determine some other” (Peirce, CP 5.253).

This temporality, however, is inferential rather than historical. It concerns mediation within cognition, not linguistic evolution across generations. The interpretive sequence does not replace one structured system with another; it extends a process of determination. Semiosis unfolds, but it does not constitute diachronic substitution in Saussure’s sense.

The False Equivalence: Temporality Is Not Diachrony

Weber’s formulation rests on a conflation: that because semiosis is temporal, it must be diachronic. This inference is untenable. Saussurean diachrony designates historical transformation between systems; Peircean succession describes logical continuity within sign-relations. These are categorically distinct.

To collapse them is to flatten two orders of analysis. Saussure investigates collective linguistic change; Peirce examines the mediation of thought. One concerns social-historical evolution, the other inferential development. The resemblance is superficial.

More troublingly, Weber’s maneuver implies an opposition between Saussurean synchrony and Peircean temporality. Yet Peirce does not attack structural analysis. He rejects “intuitive cognition,” defined as unmediated awareness (Peirce, CP 5.213). This target differs fundamentally from synchrony. Saussure’s structural method does not presuppose epistemic immediacy. It presupposes relational differentiation.

Thus the alignment rests on a misplaced parallel: synchrony is equated with immediacy, diachrony with mediation. The analogy fails at its foundation.

Architectural Incompatibility

Saussure’s central distinction—synchrony versus diachrony—organizes linguistic methodology. Peirce’s fundamental opposition concerns mediation versus intuition. These axes do not coincide. To project the former onto the latter is to superimpose one conceptual grid upon another.

Furthermore, Peirce’s account of habit undermines Weber’s implied contrast between closure and openness. Habit is not mere fixation; it is law-like generality that structures future conduct (Peirce, CP 5.476). While interpretation remains fallible, it does not dissolve into unbounded flux. The process is constrained by normativity and communal inquiry (Peirce, CP 5.311). This stabilizing dimension contradicts the portrayal of Peirce as inaugurating pure diachronic dispersal.

Weber’s framing reduces Saussure to closure and elevates Peirce as process. Such polarization simplifies both. Saussure does not deny temporality; he brackets it methodologically. Peirce does not abolish structure; he embeds it within mediation. The contrast, sharpened rhetorically, weakens philosophically.

Conceptual Migration and Its Costs

The deeper issue concerns theoretical translation. Concepts function within systems. Remove them from their original oppositional field and they lose precision. Diachronie derives meaning from its contrast with synchronie, la langue, la parole, signe, signifié, signifiant, etc. Detached from that relation, it becomes a vague synonym for temporal unfolding.

Weber’s usage exemplifies this dilution. By invoking diachrony to describe interpretant succession, he substitutes metaphor for analysis. The move is not neutral; it reshapes Peirce through a Saussurean lens. In doing so, it risks attributing to Peirce a preoccupation with structural opposition that he does not share.

Such assimilation is not merely terminological confusion. It obscures the philosophical stakes. Peirce’s critique targets immediacy, not structural coherence. Saussure’s distinction regulates method, not metaphysics. To conflate these levels is to misidentify the problem each thinker addresses.

Conclusion: Against Rhetorical Alignment

Weber’s assimilation of Saussurean diachrony into Peircean semiosis is conceptually unsound. It conflates historical substitution with logical mediation, equates structural analysis with intuitive cognition, and exaggerates a contrast between closure and openness. The effect is a stylized opposition that clarifies little and distorts much.

Comparison requires rigor, not rhetorical symmetry. Where systems differ architecturally, translation must proceed cautiously. In this case, caution is absent. Diachrony, in Saussure’s precise sense, has no equivalent in Peirce. To insist otherwise is to substitute analogy for argument.

Bibliography

Peirce, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vols. 1–6, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1935.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 (orig. 1916).

Weber, Samuel. Closure and Exclusion. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.