From Use-Value to “Deeper Reality”: The Collapse of Reference in Baudrillard
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| A Profound Reality. AI image |
Commentary on Jean Baudrillard often treats his theory of simulacra and his critique of political economy as distinct phases. A closer reading, however, reveals a structural continuity between these domains. This article argues that what Baudrillard calls “deeper reality” in the first order of simulacra can be understood as the semiotic analogue of use-value in classical political economy. Both operate as grounding principles that secure the legitimacy of a system—economic or representational—while concealing their own historical production. Tracing the erosion of these grounds makes visible a shared trajectory: the displacement of referential anchoring by autonomous relational structures.
Use-Value and the Problem of Grounding
In Capital Volume I, Karl Marx distinguishes between use-value and exchange-value. The former refers to the utility of an object, its capacity to satisfy a need; the latter expresses its equivalence within a network of exchange. Although analytically distinct, the two remain interdependent: only useful goods can circulate as commodities.
This relation grants use-value a privileged role. It appears to anchor economic processes in a material foundation: needs seem prior to exchange, and utility presents itself as self-evident. Yet Baudrillard’s early work subjects this assumption to sustained critique. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, he argues that needs are neither natural nor transparent, but shaped by social codes, institutional frameworks, and systems of differentiation. What appears as a foundation is, in fact, an effect of the system it is meant to ground.
This intervention does not simply reverse Marx’s model; it exposes a structural requirement. Any regime of equivalence depends on a term that appears to stand outside it, providing coherence and justification. Use-value fulfills this function, even as its own status proves historically contingent.
The First Order of Simulacra
A comparable configuration emerges in Baudrillard’s account of simulation. In Simulacra and Simulation, he describes the first order of simulacra as a regime in which the image is “the reflection of a profound reality.” This claim is often taken at face value, as if it affirmed a straightforward relation between sign and world. Such a reading, however, risks reinstating a metaphysical assumption that Baudrillard seeks to displace.
The “profound reality” in question is not an ontological substrate but a historically specific belief. It designates the conviction that the world exists as an ordered totality prior to representation and that signs derive their legitimacy from this presumed referent. Religious images, classical painting, and early forms of imitation operate within this horizon. The distinction between original and copy remains legible, and representation presupposes an external ground.
Yet this ground is not simply given. It is maintained through institutional practices, ritual forms, and discursive frameworks that sustain the plausibility of reference. What appears as depth is better understood as an effect of stabilization.
Homology: Use-Value and “Deeper Reality”
From this perspective, a structural homology becomes visible. Use-value in political economy and “deeper reality” in the first order of simulacra occupy analogous positions. Each serves as a grounding term that secures the coherence of a system while appearing to precede it.
Use-value guarantees that commodities correspond to needs. “Deeper reality” guarantees that signs refer to a world independent of representation. In both cases, the system depends on a referential axis that it simultaneously produces and disavows. The commodity appears useful prior to exchange, just as the sign appears meaningful prior to its circulation.
This parallel does not imply identity. Rather, it reveals a shared logic: the necessity of a term that anchors relations while remaining external to them in appearance. Without such a term, equivalence would lose its justification and difference its orientation.
The Erosion of Reference
Baudrillard’s originality lies in his account of the destabilization of this structure. In advanced consumer societies, the referential axis no longer determines value. Economic processes cease to depend on stable needs, and representational practices no longer rely on a coherent world. Relational systems begin to operate autonomously.
In the economic domain, this transformation appears as the rise of what Baudrillard terms sign-value. Objects are consumed less for their utility than for their position within a network of distinctions—status, prestige, and symbolic differentiation. The commodity becomes a sign, and consumption takes on a communicative function.
A parallel shift occurs at the level of simulation. The second order introduces mass reproduction, weakening the distinction between original and copy. In the third order, this distinction collapses altogether. Signs no longer refer to an external reality; they circulate within a closed system of differences. Baudrillard describes this condition as the “death of reference.”
The disappearance of “deeper reality” mirrors the displacement of use-value. In both cases, what once functioned as a grounding principle is revealed as contingent—and ultimately unnecessary.
Toward a Unified Theory of Value
These developments suggest that Baudrillard’s critique of political economy and his theory of simulation form a single conceptual project. Both analyze the transformation of value from a referentially anchored structure to an autonomous system of relations.
This convergence can be clarified by recalling Ferdinand de Saussure’s account of linguistic value in Course in General Linguistics. For Saussure, meaning arises from differences within a system rather than from any intrinsic connection to a referent. Baudrillard extends this insight beyond language, applying it to commodities, images, and social practices. The result is a generalized semiotics in which value is generated through relational play.
Within this framework, use-value and “deeper reality” appear as transitional constructs. They belong to a configuration in which relational systems remain anchored to an external ground. Their erosion marks the passage to a regime in which such anchoring is no longer required.
Conclusion
Interpreting “deeper reality” as the semiotic analogue of use-value clarifies the trajectory of Baudrillard’s thought. Both designate grounding functions that stabilize systems of value while masking their own constructed character. Their progressive displacement reveals a shared structural mutation: the transition from referential legitimacy to autonomous circulation.
This perspective not only illuminates the relation between Baudrillard’s early and later work but also underscores the continuity of his project. What begins as a critique of political economy culminates in a theory of simulation, yet the underlying concern remains constant: the conditions under which value—and meaning—are produced, sustained, and transformed.
References
Baudrillard, J. (1981). For a critique of the political economy of the sign (C. Levin, Trans.). Telos Press. (Original work published 1972)
Baudrillard, J. (1993). Symbolic exchange and death (I. H. Grant, Trans.). Sage. (Original work published 1976)
Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and simulation (S. F. Glaser, Trans.). University of Michigan Press. (Original work published 1981)
Marx, K. (1976). Capital: A critique of political economy (Vol. 1, B. Fowkes, Trans.). Penguin. (Original work published 1867)
Saussure, F. de. (2013). Course in general linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Bloomsbury. (Original work published 1916)

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