When Bread Becomes River: A Thought Experiment on Walter Benjamin's Theory of Translation

Introduction

Walter Benjamin's The Task of the Translator contains one of the most frequently quoted passages in twentieth-century translation theory:

"The words Brot and pain "intend" the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same. It is owing to these modes that the word Brot means something different to a German than the word pain to a Frenchman, that these words are not interchangeable for them, that, in fact, they strive to exclude each other. As to the intended object, however, the two words mean the very same thing" (Benjamin, 2000, p. 258).

The example appears almost self-evident. German and French use different words for the same object, while each language approaches that object according to its own "mode of intention." Benjamin's point is not that languages merely substitute different labels for identical realities, but that each language discloses the world in its own distinctive way.

But what if Benjamin had chosen a different example? What if, instead of bread, he had written river? A simple substitution transforms the philosophical landscape. The apparent transparency of Benjamin's example begins to disappear, and a Saussurean conception of language comes sharply into view.

Why Benjamin Chooses Bread

Benjamin's example performs two tasks simultaneously. It preserves the identity of the object while emphasizing the diversity of linguistic intention. Translation becomes possible because something remains constant across languages, yet necessary because languages do not intend that object identically.

The choice of bread is significant. Few readers hesitate before accepting that Brot and pain refer to "the same thing." The example therefore allows Benjamin to concentrate on the differences between languages without first defending the identity of the intended object.

His argument unfolds comparatively. German and French are placed into dialogue, and translation becomes the privileged site where their distinct modes of intention are revealed. The relation between languages is primary.

A Saussurean Objection

Saussure approaches language from a different direction. Before comparing languages, he asks how meaning is constituted within a single linguistic system.

As he writes,

"For some people a language, reduced to its essentials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding to a list of things. This conception is open to a number of objections. It assumes that ideas already exist independently of words. Furthermore, it leads one to assume that the link between a name and a thing is something quite unproblematic, which is far from being the case" (Saussure, 1983, p. 97).

Meaning is therefore not established by attaching words to pre-existing concepts. Rather, linguistic values emerge through relations of difference within an entire system.

Elsewhere Saussure makes the point even more explicitly:

"The content of a word is determined, in the final analysis, not by what it contains but by what exists outside it. As an element in a system, the word has not only a meaning but also—above all—a value" (Saussure, 1983, pp. 160–161).

From this perspective, the phrase "the same object" cannot simply function as the starting point of linguistic analysis. One must first ask how each language organizes conceptual distinctions.

Replacing Bread with River

Jonathan Culler illustrates this point effectively in his book Saussure. Discussing Saussure's theory, he observes that English distinguishes river from stream largely by size, whereas French distinguishes fleuve from rivière according to where the watercourse ends: a fleuve flows into the sea; a rivière does not:

“Not only does each language produce a different set of signifiers, articulating and dividing the continuum of sound in a distinctive way; each language produces a different set of signifieds; it has a distinctive and thus 'arbitrary' way of organizing the world into concepts or categories. It is obvious that the sound sequences of fleuve and riviére are signifiers of French but not of English, whereas river and stream are English but not French. Less obviously but more significantly, the organization of the conceptual plane is also different in English and French. The signified 'river' is opposed to 'stream' solely in terms of size, whereas a 'fleuve' differs from a rivière not because it is necessarily larger but because it flows into the sea, while a rivière does not. In short fleuve and rivière are not signifieds or concepts of English. They represent a different articulation of the conceptual plane” (Culler, 1976).

The consequence is methodological rather than merely lexical. English and French do not simply attach different names to identical concepts. They divide the conceptual field differently.

Now imagine Benjamin had written:

"The words river and fleuve intend the same object..."

The sentence immediately becomes problematic.

Which English word corresponds to fleuve?

River?

Sometimes.

Always?

No.

Conversely, does river correspond to rivière?

Again, only in certain contexts.

The thought experiment reveals what Benjamin's original example conceals. Before asking whether two languages intend the same object differently, we must determine whether they organize the conceptual domain in the same way. For Saussure, that question cannot be answered by comparing isolated words; it requires examining the internal structure of each linguistic system:  

“So the value of any given word is determined by what other words there are in that particular area of the vocabulary. That is true even of a word like soleil (‘sun’). No word has a value that can be identified independently of what else there is in its vicinity” (Saussure, 1983, pp. 160–161).

Two Ways of Thinking About Language

Benjamin and Saussure therefore begin from different methodological commitments.

Benjamin starts with the relation between languages. Translation becomes the privileged means through which different linguistic intentions supplement one another and gesture toward what he calls "pure language."

Saussure begins elsewhere. His primary concern is the synchronic organization of an individual linguistic system. Only after describing the differential values that constitute meaning within that system does comparison become possible.

The disagreement is therefore not simply about translation. It concerns the proper object of linguistic inquiry itself.

Benjamin asks how languages relate to one another.

Saussure asks what makes each language a system in the first place.

Conclusion

Benjamin's example of Brot and pain has become canonical because it expresses, with remarkable economy, the intuition that translation involves more than lexical substitution. Different languages disclose the world differently.

Yet a small thought experiment exposes the limits of that formulation. Replacing bread with river reveals that the identity of the "same object" cannot always be assumed. The conceptual field itself varies from one language to another.

Seen from a Saussurean perspective, this is not an exceptional case but a general principle. Words derive their value from the network of differences that constitutes a linguistic system. Translation therefore encounters not only different expressions of a common object but, at times, different articulations of the conceptual world itself.

Related Post

A Critical Analysis of Putnam's Thought Experiment: Twin Earth from a Saussurean Perspective

https://derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com/2024/07/blog-post_17.html

References

Benjamin, W. (2000). The task of the translator. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans., pp. 253–263). Schocken Books.

Culler, J. (1976). Saussure. Fontana/Collins.

Saussure, F. de. (1983). Course in General Linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Duckworth.