Modes of Intention and the Problem of the “Same Object”: Benjamin Between Linguistic Tradition and Structural Critique

The words Brot and pain "intend" the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same. It is owing to these modes that the word Brot means something different to a German than the word pain to a Frenchman, that these words are not interchangeable for them, that, in fact, they strive to exclude each other. As to the intended object, however, the two words mean the very same thing.

—    - Walter Benjamin, The task of the translator

Introduction

“The words Brot and pain ‘intend’ the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same…” (Benjamin, 2000, p. 258). The apparent simplicity of this formulation conceals a decisive assumption about language: that translation operates on a shared object whose identity remains intact across linguistic systems. Meaning is thereby divided between what is referred to and the manner in which it is referred to.

Yet this distinction is not self-evident. What sustains this symmetry is less transparent than it first appears. The notion of a “same object” already presupposes a particular ontology of meaning—one in which objects remain stable across languages while difference is displaced onto the level of linguistic form. To understand the implications of Benjamin’s claim, it is necessary to situate it within a longer tradition of reflection on language and meaning before examining the challenge posed by structural linguistics.

Reference and Mediation in the Classical Tradition

A persistent strand of Western philosophy situates language within a mediating chain linking words, thought, and things. In Aristotle’s account, spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, which in turn correspond to objects in the world (Aristotle, trans. 1938). Meaning is therefore neither purely linguistic nor immediately present in things themselves; it emerges through a relation that connects language to reality through cognition.

Augustine develops a similar conception when he defines a sign as something that “shows itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind” (Augustine, trans. 1953). Although the sign possesses a sensible form, its function lies in directing attention beyond itself. In both thinkers, language ultimately refers to a reality that exists independently of linguistic expression.

Within such a framework, the possibility that different languages may designate the same object presents no particular difficulty. What remains largely unexplored, however, is how linguistic differences themselves contribute to meaning.

Humboldt and Linguistic Articulation

A significant shift occurs with Wilhelm von Humboldt, who famously describes language not as a finished product (ergon) but as an ongoing activity (energeia) (Humboldt, 1836/1999). Language no longer appears as a collection of names attached to an already organized world. Rather, it becomes the medium through which human beings shape and apprehend experience.

From this perspective, linguistic diversity cannot be reduced to alternative vocabularies. Each language embodies a distinctive way of organizing experience and presenting the world. The importance of linguistic difference lies not merely in what is named but in how reality becomes intelligible through language.

Benjamin’s distinction between Brot and pain becomes intelligible against this background. The difference between the two words does not arise from their referring to different things but from the particular way each language approaches what is referred to. His notion of a “mode of intention” extends Humboldt’s insight that languages differ not simply in vocabulary but in their manner of disclosing the world.

Phenomenological Mediation and Intentional Structure

A further clarification emerges through phenomenology. For Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of something; every act of awareness involves both an intended object and a particular mode in which that object is given (Husserl, 1913/1983). The same object may be perceived, remembered, imagined, or described without ceasing to be the same object.

This distinction helps illuminate Benjamin’s terminology. The “same object” corresponds to what is intended, while the “mode of intention” designates the manner of its presentation. Yet Benjamin introduces an important modification. What phenomenology locates in consciousness, he relocates to language itself. Linguistic systems become bearers of distinct modes of intention.

Seen from this angle, Benjamin occupies a position at the intersection of two traditions: Humboldt’s concern with linguistic difference and phenomenology’s concern with intentionality.

Benjamin and the Stability of Meaning

Benjamin’s argument can thus be reconstructed around three interconnected claims. First, different languages may converge upon the same object. Second, they do so through distinct modes of intention. Third, these modes account for linguistic difference without undermining the identity of what is intended.

The originality of this position lies in its attempt to preserve both unity and difference. Translation is possible because something remains constant across languages, yet translation is necessary because linguistic forms are not interchangeable.

The balance is delicate, however. The continuity that makes translation possible depends upon the assumption that what is intended retains its identity across linguistic boundaries. Whether that identity can be maintained independently of language remains an open question.

Language as System of Value: A Saussurean Challenge

Saussure’s theory of language places this assumption under pressure. Rejecting the view of language as a nomenclature, he argues that linguistic signs do not merely attach names to pre-existing ideas. Prior to language, thought is “a vague, shapeless cloud” in which no determinate concepts are already available (Saussure, 1983, p. 111). Nor does the phonic continuum contain naturally given units.

Language arises through the articulation of these two amorphous domains, producing values through relations of difference. Meaning is therefore not derived from independently constituted concepts but from the position signs occupy within a system.

From this perspective, Benjamin’s claim that Brot and pain “intend the same object” becomes problematic. The difficulty is not that the two words differ, but that the identity of what is supposedly shared is treated as self-evident. If concepts are constituted through linguistic differences rather than given in advance, then the sameness of the intended object cannot simply be presupposed. Benjamin is far from a simple nomenclaturist, yet his account continues to rely on a continuity of meaning that Saussure’s theory refuses to take for granted.

Conclusion

Benjamin’s distinction between object and mode of intention occupies a revealing position in the history of linguistic thought. It preserves the classical intuition that different expressions may converge on the same object while incorporating a modern sensitivity to the irreducible differences between languages. Translation thus becomes neither the replacement of one label with another nor the fusion of distinct linguistic worlds, but an encounter between different modes of meaning.

The tension emerges when Benjamin’s formulation is viewed through a Saussurean lens. If linguistic value arises from relations internal to a system, then the identity of the “same object” can no longer function as an unquestioned foundation. Benjamin’s famous example of Brot and pain therefore reveals more than a theory of translation. It exposes a deeper disagreement about whether meaning precedes language or emerges from the differences through which language itself becomes possible.

References (APA style)

Aristotle. (1938). De interpretatione (E. M. Edghill, Trans.). In W. D. Ross (Ed.), The Works of Aristotle. Oxford University Press.

Augustine. (1953). On dialectic (J. J. O’Donnell, Trans.). Catholic University of America Press.

Benjamin, W. (2000). The task of the translator. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Illuminations (H. Zohn, Trans., pp. 253–263). Schocken Books.

Humboldt, W. von. (1999). On language: On the diversity of human language construction (M. Losonsky, Ed.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1836)

Husserl, E. (1913/1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Springer.

Saussure, F. de. (1983). Course in general linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Duckworth.