Why Do the Critics of Aristotle Live "Aristotelian" Lives?
For more than two millennia, Aristotle’s account of the good life has shaped philosophical reflection on human flourishing. Yet many influential thinkers of the twentieth century rejected one of its central assumptions: that human beings possess a fixed nature with a determinate end.
Existentialists famously declared that “existence precedes essence,” while poststructuralists questioned stable foundations of identity, meaning, and reason. From this perspective, Aristotle’s conception of the contemplative life appears to belong to a metaphysical world that modern philosophy has left behind.
And yet an unexpected tension remains. Many philosophers who denied any predetermined human purpose nevertheless devoted their lives to precisely the activity Aristotle regarded as the highest expression of human fulfillment: sustained intellectual inquiry. They immersed themselves in reading, writing, teaching, and archival research, often at the expense of wealth, prestige, or comfort. Their theories challenged Aristotle, but their biographies seem to echo him.
This observation does not demonstrate that Aristotle was correct. It does, however, raise a question worth pursuing: can the way philosophers live disclose something that their theoretical commitments deny?
Aristotle and the Highest Form of Life
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes among several ways of living. Some pursue pleasure, others seek honor through political engagement, while a third group dedicates itself to contemplation (bios theoretikos). He argues that genuine happiness (eudaimonia) cannot be reduced to pleasure or external success. Rather, it consists in the excellent activity of the capacities distinctive to human beings.
His reasoning follows what is commonly called the ergon argument. Every being has a characteristic activity: a knife cuts, an eye sees, a horse fulfills its nature through movement appropriate to its kind. Since rational activity distinguishes human beings from other living creatures, Aristotle concludes that the fullest human life is one in which reason is actively exercised.
“Happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (Aristotle, ca. 350 BCE/2009, I.7), and contemplation represents its highest expression because it is pursued for its own sake rather than as a means to something else.
When Essence Disappears
Twentieth-century philosophy cast doubt on this framework. Jean-Paul Sartre famously argued that “existence precedes essence,” denying that human beings possess a fixed nature. Thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida likewise questioned inherited notions of stable identity, universal reason, and metaphysical foundations.
From this perspective, Aristotle’s hierarchy of human activities loses its grounding. If there is no intrinsic human function, why should contemplation occupy any privileged position? Intellectual work would appear to be one possible choice among others, rather than the realization of a universal human vocation.
The Philosophers’ Paradox
At this point, our discussion takes an unexpected turn.
Despite their theoretical disagreements with Aristotle, many of these thinkers structured their entire lives around intellectual labor. Foucault devoted years to archival investigation before publishing his major works. Derrida spent decades developing intricate analyses of language, writing, and metaphysics. Sartre produced philosophy, novels, plays, and political essays with remarkable consistency.
None of this shows that Aristotle’s metaphysics is correct. One may choose contemplation for many reasons unrelated to any belief in human essence.
Still, their biographies generate a philosophical puzzle. If contemplation lacks any special status, why does it repeatedly become the organizing principle of such intellectually intense lives? Why not devote equal energy to financial success, public recognition, or other available forms of achievement?
The tension here is not logical but performative: philosophical systems reject Aristotle’s framework, while lived practice often appears to grant sustained reflection a distinctive priority.
What Kind of Life Are We Choosing?
The paradox extends beyond professional philosophy. It raises a more general question about everyday life: what do we continue to do when external rewards lose their hold?
If wealth, recognition, and social validation were removed, what activity would remain compelling in itself?
For some, the answer lies in artistic creation, scientific investigation, teaching, or philosophical reflection. These practices do not require belief in a fixed human essence. Yet they reveal persistent orientations that cannot be fully explained by external incentives alone.
Aristotle’s insight may lie less in his metaphysical system than in the question it forces upon us: a good life is shaped not only by what we attain, but by the activities to which we repeatedly return because they seem intrinsically worthwhile.
Conclusion
Aristotle’s account of human nature remains contested, and modern philosophy has offered powerful objections to its teleological assumptions. Even so, the lives of many thinkers who reject his conclusions appear to align, in practice, with his ideal of contemplative activity.
This irony does not settle the debate over human essence. It does, however, suggest that biography can complicate philosophy. The sustained practices of reading, writing, and thinking may reveal an enduring human orientation that survives even when its theoretical justification is denied.
Whether contemplation reflects a fundamental feature of human nature or simply one compelling way of living among others, its persistent appeal among philosophers invites further reflection. Aristotle may not have had the final word, but he continues to shape the questions we find difficult to escape.
References
Aristotle. (2009). Nicomachean Ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.; L. Brown, Ed.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published ca. 350 BCE)
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). Pantheon Books.
Sartre, J.-P. (2007). Existentialism Is a Humanism (C. Macomber, Trans.). Yale University Press. (Original lecture delivered 1946)
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