Can You Learn the Meaning of "Cheese" by Pointing? Translation as a Philosophical Experiment

Introduction

Imagine trying to teach someone the English word cheese. You hold up a piece of Camembert, point to it, and say, "Cheese." It seems like the simplest possible language lesson. Surely the learner now knows what the word means.

Yet this ordinary scene conceals one of the deepest questions in the philosophy of language. Has the learner really acquired the meaning of the word? Or have they merely associated a sound with a particular object?

This question brings together three thinkers whose interests might initially seem unrelated: Bertrand Russell, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Roman Jakobson. Russell maintains that words ultimately derive their significance from our acquaintance with the world. Saussure argues that meaning emerges from a system of linguistic differences rather than from direct contact with objects. Jakobson, meanwhile, offers an unexpected way of testing these competing intuitions. Translation, he suggests, is not merely a practical activity. It is a philosophical experiment.

This article argues that translation does more than transfer meanings from one language to another. It reveals how languages organize meaning and, in doing so, places competing theories of language to the test.

Russell: Meaning Begins with Experience

In a short essay on logical positivism, Russell introduces the now famous example of cheese to criticize philosophers who treat language as though it could be understood independently of experience:

"Absorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the connection of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connection which gives meaning to words and significance to sentences. No one can understand the word “cheese” unless he has a non-linguistic acquaintance with cheese. " (Russell, 1950, p.18).

Russell's concern is fundamentally epistemological. Language cannot float free of the world. Words ultimately acquire significance because they are connected with perception, action, and experience. Without this connection, they risk becoming empty symbols referring only to one another.

His criticism is directed particularly at philosophers who focus exclusively on logical analysis while neglecting the psychological processes through which human beings first encounter reality. However sophisticated our linguistic theories become, Russell insists, they must remain anchored in lived experience.

At first sight, this seems entirely persuasive. If someone has never seen, tasted, or handled cheese, how could they genuinely understand the word?

Why Pointing Is Not Enough

Roman Jakobson opens On Linguistic Aspects of Translation by citing Russell's example. He does not deny that experience matters. Instead, he questions whether experience alone can determine linguistic meaning.

He asks us to reconsider the apparently straightforward act of pointing. Suppose a speaker indicates a piece of Camembert while uttering the word cheese. What exactly has been taught? The demonstration is radically ambiguous. The speaker might be referring to:

• this particular piece,
• Camembert,
• cheese in general,
• dairy products,
• food,
• something edible,
• the box containing the cheese,
• or even an object being offered for sale (Jakobson, 1959, p. 232).

Nothing in the gesture itself determines which interpretation is intended.

The object therefore cannot establish the meaning of the word by itself. Successful communication presupposes something else: participation in a shared linguistic system.

Here Saussure's famous observation becomes especially illuminating. Rejecting the traditional picture of language as a catalogue of names attached to independently existing things, he writes:

"For some people a language, reduced to its essentials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding to a list of things... it leads one to assume that the link between a name and a thing is something quite unproblematic, which is far from being the case" (Saussure, 1983, p. 65).

He immediately rejects this conception. Words do not simply label pre-existing concepts waiting in the world to be discovered. Their value depends upon the network of differences established within the language itself.

Imaginary entities illustrate the point particularly well. No one has ever encountered a unicorn, yet competent speakers understand the word. Likewise, very few people have direct acquaintance with black holes, yet they can follow discussions about them. Experience undoubtedly enriches understanding, but linguistic meaning cannot be reduced to acquaintance with the referent alone.

Translation Puts Meaning to the Test

Jakobson's most original contribution in On Linguistic Aspects of Translation appears when he returns to the example of cheese a few pages later. This time, however, the discussion concerns translation.

He writes:

"The English word 'cheese' cannot be completely identified with its standard Russian heteronym сыр, because cottage cheese is a cheese but not a сыр. Russians say: принеси сыру и творогу, 'bring cheese and cottage cheese'" (Jakobson, 1959, p. 233).

The example appears trivial until one examines it closely. English groups cottage cheese together with Cheddar, Brie, and Camembert under the general category cheese. Standard Russian does not. Instead, it distinguishes сыр from творог, so that a Russian speaker naturally says: "Bring cheese and cottage cheese."

To an English speaker, the phrase sounds oddly repetitive. In Russian, however, no redundancy exists because the two nouns belong to different conceptual categories.

The dairy products themselves have not changed. What differs is the way each language organizes this portion of experience.

Translation therefore uncovers something that ordinarily remains invisible to native speakers: languages do not simply attach different names to identical concepts.

Jonathan Culler offers a parallel example while explaining Saussure's theory. English distinguishes river from stream largely according to size. French distinguishes fleuve from rivière according to destination: a fleuve flows into the sea, whereas a rivière joins another river. As Culler observes, these are not merely different words but different ways of organizing the conceptual field (Culler, 1976, p. 18).

The similarity with Jakobson's example is striking. Neither concerns words alone. Both reveal that languages partition experience according to different principles.

Translation as a Philosophical Experiment

Russell, Saussure, and Jakobson are often presented as addressing different questions. Yet Jakobson's discussion of translation unexpectedly brings their positions into conversation.

Russell reminds us that language must remain connected with experience. Saussure argues that experience alone cannot explain linguistic meaning. Jakobson demonstrates why through translation.

If the meaning of cheese consisted simply in acquaintance with cheese itself, translating the word ought to be relatively straightforward. English and Russian speakers encounter essentially the same dairy products. Yet translation immediately exposes conceptual mismatches.

These mismatches do not arise because one community lacks experience of cottage cheese or fermented curds. They arise because each language organizes those experiences differently.

Translation therefore becomes more than a practical exercise. It functions as a philosophical experiment. Every successful translation shows that messages can be communicated across languages. Every imperfect equivalence reveals that meaning cannot be reduced to the objects words designate. It also depends upon the conceptual structures through which each language organizes experience.

Jakobson thus shifts the discussion from reference to organization. Translation does not merely transfer meanings. It makes visible the hidden architecture through which languages construct them.

Conclusion

The simple act of pointing to a piece of Camembert turns out to raise surprisingly complex philosophical questions. Russell sees the gesture as reminding us that language ultimately depends upon our acquaintance with the world. Saussure argues that objects alone cannot explain linguistic meaning because words acquire their value within a system of differences. Jakobson offers perhaps the most revealing perspective of all. Translation allows us to test these competing intuitions empirically.

His comparison between cheese and сыр demonstrates that meaning cannot simply be read from the object before us. Different languages organize the same domain of experience according to different conceptual principles. Translation makes those otherwise invisible structures visible.

Seen in this light, translation is far more than the search for equivalent words. It is an inquiry into the nature of meaning itself. Whenever two languages resist perfect correspondence, they remind us that words do not merely mirror reality. They also reflect the distinctive ways in which linguistic communities divide, classify, and make sense of the world.

References

Culler, J. (1976). Saussure. Fontana.

Jakobson, R. (1959). On linguistic aspects of translation. In R. A. Brower (Ed.), On Translation (pp. 232–239). Harvard University Press.

Russell, B. (1950). Logical positivism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4(13), 3–22.

Saussure, F. de. (1983). Course in General Linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Duckworth. (Original work published 1916)