Why Is Language the “Most Important” Sign System? Saussure’s Paradox and the Patronage of the Symbol

Introduction: The Problem of Linguistic Privilege

Saussure's theory of signs contains a tension that would shape much of twentieth-century semiotic thought. In the Course in General Linguistics, he introduces semiology as a general science of signs within which linguistics would constitute only one branch. Language belongs to a larger field that includes writing, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and other systems of signification.

Yet Saussure also grants language a unique status. Among all these systems, linguistics is not merely one example among others; it is, he writes, "the most important of such systems." This qualification raises a fundamental question: how can language be both one sign system among others and the privileged model through which other signs become intelligible?

This tension became increasingly visible in later semiotic theory. Barthes and Hjelmslev moved beyond Saussure's original formulation by suggesting, in different ways, that semiology itself should be understood through linguistics rather than linguistics through semiology. Derrida would later question precisely this movement: if language is only one semiological system among others, why should it become the "patron" of all branches of semiology?

This article argues that Peirce's theory of symbols provides a way of understanding this apparent contradiction. Language does not occupy a privileged position because all signs are reducible to language. Rather, its importance derives from the distinctive role symbolic forms play in organizing, communicating, and reflecting upon processes of signification.

Saussure's Paradox: One System Among Others, Yet the Most Important

Saussure introduces semiology by placing language within a broader universe of signs:

"A language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on."

The significance of this statement is often overlooked. Language is not presented as an isolated phenomenon or as the exclusive foundation of meaning. On the contrary, Saussure explicitly situates it among other systems through which human beings produce and interpret signs.

He therefore concludes:

"Linguistics is only one branch of this general science."

At first sight, this seems to establish a clear hierarchy: semiology is the larger field, and linguistics is one of its particular domains. Yet Saussure immediately introduces a qualification that complicates this apparently egalitarian arrangement:

"It is simply the most important of such systems."

The tension is not accidental. Saussure seems to recognize both the plurality of sign systems and the special position of language within that plurality. Language belongs to the general field of signs, but it also possesses a distinctive importance that separates it from other forms of signification.

The question, then, is why language, while remaining one sign system among others, should acquire a privileged role within the study of signification itself.

It is precisely this unresolved tension that later thinkers would develop in different directions.

Barthes and Hjelmslev: Making Explicit an Implicit Potential

Barthes and Hjelmslev can be understood not simply as rejecting Saussure's model but as radicalizing one possibility already contained within it. Both recognized that linguistic analysis offered a powerful framework for studying cultural phenomena that exceeded traditional linguistics.

Barthes proposed a reversal of Saussure's original relationship between linguistics and semiology. Rather than placing linguistics within a broader science of signs, he suggested that semiology should become part of linguistics:

"Semiology is a part of linguistics — more precisely, the part that would deal with the large signifying units of discourse."

This reversal was not based on the claim that all signs are linguistic. Rather, Barthes observed that many cultural systems become available for analysis through discourse. Myth, narrative, journalism, and advertising are not simply collections of isolated signs; they are meaningful structures articulated, circulated, and interpreted through language.

Hjelmslev developed a related but even broader conception in Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. By expanding linguistics beyond the study of natural languages, he transformed it into a general theory of signifying structures. Linguistics, in this wider sense, becomes not merely the study of verbal language but a model for understanding signification more generally.

Hjelmslev even argues:

“We are thus led to regard all science as centered around linguistics.”

The claim appears radical, but it expresses a recurring insight: knowledge requires symbolic articulation. Scientific concepts, classifications, theories, and explanations do not simply exist; they must be formulated, transmitted, and interpreted through systems of signs.

The importance of Barthes and Hjelmslev therefore lies not in reducing all signs to language, but in recognizing that symbolic forms repeatedly become the medium through which other forms of signification become objects of analysis and reflection.

Yet this move creates a new problem. If language occupies such a privileged position, what justifies this privilege? At what point does an effective analytical model become the organizing principle for an entire science of signs?

This is the question Derrida would bring to the foreground.

Derrida and the Problem of Patronage

Derrida’s reading of Saussure in Glas focuses precisely on the tension created by the privileged status of language. He returns to the passage in which Saussure describes language as “the most complex and universal of all systems of expression” and argues that linguistics can become the general “patron” of all branches of semiology, even though language remains only one particular semiological system. Derrida identifies this passage as the point where Saussure establishes what he calls the “patronage” of linguistics:

“The Glas fleshes [acharne] a grammatological reading of Saussure, always, precisely, of that page of the Course that establishes linguistics in its patronage: ‘So signs, it can be said, that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process [procédé]; that is why language [langue], the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the general patron for all branches of semiology, although language is only one particular semiological system.’ I have underlined although: the violent institution of the patronate.”

For Derrida, the difficulty is concentrated in a single word: although. Saussure’s formulation appears to establish a hierarchy at the very moment it claims to describe a general field of signs. The problem is not whether language is important. Its importance is undeniable. The question is why this particular sign system should become the model through which all others are understood.

If language is one system among many, what authorizes it to occupy the position of organizing principle? Derrida’s critique identifies a genuine tension: a general science of signs seems to require a certain distance from any particular system of signification, yet Saussure grants language a privileged role within that science. The part appears to acquire authority over the whole.

However, this tension does not necessarily indicate that Saussure overlooked the diversity of signs. On the contrary, his own formulation begins from an awareness of that diversity. The issue is not whether language belongs to semiology; it clearly does. The issue is why language repeatedly becomes the privileged medium through which semiotic systems are analyzed and theorized.

Derrida reveals the philosophical difficulty of this privilege, but the question remains: what semiotic function allows language to acquire such a position without reducing all signs to linguistic forms?

Peirce’s theory of symbols provides a possible answer.

Peirce and the Privilege of Symbols

Unlike Saussure, whose theory begins with the linguistic sign, Charles Sanders Peirce develops a general account of signification that includes different forms of representation. His distinction among icons, indices, and symbols provides a framework for understanding why one type of sign may acquire a distinctive role without eliminating the others.

Icons signify through resemblance. A portrait, for example, represents a person because of a perceived similarity between the image and its object. Indices depend on a direct connection between sign and object: smoke indicates fire, a footprint indicates a previous presence, and a symptom points toward an underlying condition.

Symbols function differently. They do not depend on resemblance or physical connection but on convention, habit, and shared forms of interpretation. Words are the clearest example. The term “tree” has no natural relation to the object it designates; its meaning emerges from its position within a system of social usage.

For Peirce, however, these forms of signification do not operate separately. Human reasoning depends upon their interaction:

“We have to use a mixture of likenesses, indices, and symbols.”

Thought does not proceed through symbols alone. Scientific investigation, for example, depends on diagrams, observations, measurements, traces, and theoretical concepts. Icons and indices contribute essential information that cannot simply be replaced by abstract signs.

Yet Peirce’s account also reveals why symbols acquire a special status. Although reasoning begins with heterogeneous signs, the results of reasoning are often stabilized and communicated through symbolic forms. Scientific theories, mathematical formulas, explanations, and propositions provide examples of this process. Symbols do not eliminate other signs; rather, they allow different kinds of signs to be integrated into forms that can be transmitted, interpreted, and developed further.

This point helps clarify the intuition behind Barthes and Hjelmslev. Their emphasis on language does not necessarily imply that all signs are linguistic. Images, gestures, rituals, and material practices retain their own modes of signification. The privileged role of language emerges instead from the function symbolic forms perform within cognition and communication: they provide a medium through which diverse signs become available for reflection and systematic knowledge.

From this perspective, linguistic centrality appears less as an arbitrary hierarchy than as a consequence of the role symbolic forms play in organizing semiosis. Language is not privileged because other signs are incomplete versions of it. Images are not defective words, and indices are not failed symbols. Each type of sign contributes differently to meaning. Language becomes distinctive because symbolic forms provide one of the principal means through which these different contributions can be articulated, connected, and made available for analysis.

Peirce therefore offers a way of understanding the tension identified by Derrida. He does not deny the plurality of sign systems, nor does he reduce them to language. Instead, he explains why one type of sign can occupy a privileged position within a broader semiotic field.

Conclusion: The Most Important of Such Systems

Saussure’s apparently modest qualification—that language is “the most important of such systems”—contains the central problem that would animate later debates in semiotic theory. Barthes and Hjelmslev developed the implications of language’s privileged role; Derrida exposed the difficulty involved in granting one sign system authority over all others; Peirce provides a framework for understanding why such privilege emerges.

Language remains one sign system among others. It does not exhaust the possibilities of meaning, nor can other signs be reduced to linguistic forms. Yet symbolic articulation occupies a distinctive place in human cognition because it allows heterogeneous signs to be organized, communicated, and made available for reflection.

The paradox identified by Saussure therefore does not disappear. Language is both a particular sign system and the privileged medium through which sign systems become objects of knowledge. The phrase “the most important of such systems” may already contain the question that would shape the future of semiotics: how can language be one sign system among others while simultaneously becoming the privileged medium through which signs themselves become intelligible?

References

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Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies (A. Lavers, Trans.). Hill and Wang. (Original work published 1957)

Derrida, J. (1986). Glas (J. P. Leavey Jr. & R. Rand, Trans.). University of Nebraska Press. (Original work published 1974)

Harris, R. (2001). Saussure and his interpreters. Edinburgh University Press.

Hjelmslev, L. (1961). Prolegomena to a theory of language (F. J. Whitfield, Trans.). University of Wisconsin Press. (Original work published 1943)

Nöth, W. (1990). Handbook of semiotics. Indiana University Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1998). The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913) (The Peirce Edition Project, Eds.). Indiana University Press.

Saussure, F. de. (1983). Course in general linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). Open Court. (Original work published 1916)

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