The Odd One Out: Borges and French Theory
Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Jorge Luis Borges. Which of these four names seems out of place? The first three belong to the history of French philosophy and theory; the fourth was an Argentine writer whose fiction explores labyrinths, imaginary encyclopedias, and infinite libraries. Asked to identify the odd one out, most readers would probably choose Borges.
Yet the opening of Foucault’s The Order of Things complicates that answer. “This book first arose out of a passage in Borges,” he writes, recalling the laughter that shattered, as he read it, “all the familiar landmarks of my thought”—the assumptions shaped by his age and intellectual world (Foucault, 1994, p. xv). The remark presents a work of fiction as the starting point of a philosophical investigation. Borges had unsettled the coordinates through which Foucault was accustomed to think, helping him recognize a problem that would become central to his book.
Foucault was not the only French theorist to find philosophical resources in Borges’s fiction. Lyotard, too, drew on one of his stories to explore questions of representation and subjectivity, while Derrida invoked Borges in an argument about philosophical language and metaphor. What made Borges’s literary inventions so productive for these thinkers? How did a writer who seemed to belong to a different intellectual field come to participate in the making of French theory?
2. The Book That Began with Borges
The passage that provoked Foucault’s laughter comes from Borges’s “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins,” first published in 1942 and later collected in Other Inquisitions (Borges, 1964). Borges introduces a purported Chinese encyclopedia whose classification of animals includes those “belonging to the Emperor,” “embalmed,” “sucking pigs,” “sirens,” and “drawn with a very fine camelhair brush.” Other entries refer to animals “included in the present classification” or those that, “from a long way off,” look like flies. The categories mix ownership, physical condition, mythological creatures, artistic representation, and the observer’s perspective, without offering an obvious principle that would organize them all.
The list is funny partly because it frustrates our expectations of a taxonomy. We can understand each phrase individually, yet struggle to imagine the common ground on which all these items could belong together. The difficulty lies in the relation between the categories: what kind of space would make their coexistence intelligible? Borges’s imaginary encyclopedia makes the problem of classification visible by presenting an arrangement that resists the assumptions through which we ordinarily recognize an order.
In the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault describes the passage as having shattered “all the familiar landmarks of my thought” (1994, p. xv). Its effect concerns the conditions that allow things to be distinguished, grouped, and made intelligible in the first place. Foucault’s inquiry examines the historical conditions under which particular forms of knowledge become possible, including the rules that determine what can count as an object of knowledge and how different objects can be related. Borges’s fictitious taxonomy unsettles the apparently self-evident ground on which such operations depend.
The story does not provide Foucault with a theory of these historical conditions, and his book cannot be reduced to an interpretation of Borges. Its role is more specific: it makes the familiar act of ordering the world appear strange enough to become a problem. Fiction can therefore contribute to philosophical inquiry before it offers any answer, by disturbing the assumptions that had made a question seem unnecessary.
3. Mirrors, Multiplicity, and the Subject
In “The Fauna of Mirrors,” included in The Book of Imaginary Beings (Borges & Guerrero, 1969), Borges recounts a legend about two worlds that once coexisted in freedom. The inhabitants of the mirrors possessed their own forms and colours, and the human and specular kingdoms could pass into one another. Their relationship changed when the mirror creatures invaded the human world. The Yellow Emperor defeated them through magic, imprisoned them behind reflective surfaces, and compelled them to imitate human actions. Their former powers were suppressed, although the legend anticipates a future in which the spell will break and the creatures will return.
Jean-François Lyotard takes up this story in his 1973 essay on the paintings of Jacques Monory, using it to explore the constitution of the modern subject. The mirror becomes an image of the boundary through which experience is organized into representations recognizable to consciousness. For a person to experience a unified self, the movements of experience must be gathered into a form that can be identified as one’s own. Lyotard’s reading connects this coherence to the containment of forces that resist incorporation into an ordered representation.
As Lyotard puts it, in the English translation quoted by Peter Dews, “The existence of the subject depends on this wall, on the enslavement of the fluid and lethal powers repressed on the other side, on the function of representing them” (as cited in Dews, 1986). The mirror creatures thus become a way of thinking about the relation between subjectivity and what its apparent unity excludes. A stable identity may depend on the restraint of movements and differences that cannot readily be accommodated within a coherent account of the self.
Borges’s story and Lyotard’s interpretation nevertheless perform different tasks. Borges tells a legend about the defeat and possible return of a strange population; Lyotard makes its division between worlds serve as a model for the formation of subjectivity. His reading brings out the violence implied in the suppression of the mirror creatures, while placing less emphasis on the story’s literary and mythological dimensions. Dews questions whether Lyotard’s emphasis on forces escaping subjective control adequately accounts for the historical and social conditions through which subjects are formed. The disagreement matters because it shows that a philosophical appropriation of literature is itself an interpretation, with particular emphases and possible limitations.
4. Borges Reads French Theory Back
In “The Fearful Sphere of Pascal,” Borges follows the history of an image that has appeared in different philosophical and theological settings: the sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. Across its various uses, the image can suggest divine perfection, the structure of the universe, or the difficulty of locating a determinate centre. Borges proposes that “universal history is the history of the different intonations given a handful of metaphors” (Borges, 1964). A figure can persist across centuries while acquiring a different force in each context that takes it up.
Jacques Derrida invokes this formulation in “Violence and Metaphysics,” his essay on Emmanuel Levinas, while considering the relation between language and philosophical history. He writes that if there is no history except through language, and language is fundamentally metaphorical, philosophical thought cannot simply step outside the figures through which it expresses itself (Derrida, 1978). He brings Borges’s observation into an examination of the metaphors that shape philosophical accounts of the other, including the language of light, vision, and manifestation. Even a thinker who seeks to challenge the tradition’s assumptions must work with a language already marked by them. The task, then, is to examine how inherited figures operate and how their use might be transformed.
Borges’s sentence acquires a philosophical force in this context because it draws attention to the historical life of figures that thought repeatedly employs. Derrida does not merely transfer Borges’s observation into philosophical terminology: he uses it to frame a difficulty within Levinas’s attempt to articulate an ethical relation to the other without reproducing the assumptions of the philosophical tradition he criticizes. The question becomes how philosophical language can alter the meanings and effects of its inherited figures when it cannot simply escape them.
This encounter also invites us to read Borges independently of Derrida’s purposes. Borges’s essay moves through the history of an image, attending to its variations across authors and traditions. Derrida’s argument highlights the problem of philosophical language, while Borges’s literary-historical approach has its own texture and range. As Bruno Bosteels (2023) argues in his account of Borges’s reception in France, the encounter between the Argentine writer and French theory involves both affinities and tensions. Borges’s intellectual formation also drew on traditions, including New England pragmatism, that do not fit neatly within the commitments of his French readers. The reception of Borges is therefore more than a story of ideas passing from literature into philosophy: it is also a meeting between distinct intellectual projects, each of which can illuminate the other without exhausting it.
5. The Supplement That Wasn’t Supposed to Matter
The three encounters reveal different ways in which Borges’s fiction enters philosophical work. His encyclopedia helped Foucault turn the conditions of classification into a problem; his mirror creatures gave Lyotard an image through which to examine the formation of subjectivity; and his account of metaphor helped Derrida articulate a difficulty concerning the language of philosophy. These are distinct uses, and their significance depends on the particular questions each thinker was pursuing.
Derrida’s notion of the supplement offers a way to interpret what these cases have in common. In Of Grammatology, the supplement appears as an addition to something that seems complete in itself, yet its presence can expose a dependence that the original arrangement cannot fully acknowledge (Derrida, 1976). What seems external may reveal a need within what it supplements.
Applied here as an analogy, the idea helps explain why Borges’s apparent distance from philosophy matters. His fiction enters these arguments from outside their established conceptual frameworks, yet its contribution changes what those frameworks can make visible. This does not mean that the three encounters are direct examples of Derrida’s theory of the supplement, or that Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida are pursuing the same project. It means that the relation between literature and philosophy can be more consequential than the division between their disciplines initially suggests.
6. Who, Then, Was the Odd One Out?
So who was the odd one out? Borges remains a writer of fiction, while Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida remain philosophers and theorists. Their differences should not be dissolved into a single intellectual enterprise. What changes is our understanding of what those differences permit: Borges’s fiction could participate in philosophical inquiry without ceasing to be literature or becoming a philosophical system in its own right.
Disciplinary boundaries help us distinguish intellectual practices, but they cannot fully explain how problems emerge or how they acquire new forms. The history considered here suggests that ideas may develop through encounters that established categories do not readily predict. Borges appeared to stand outside the group; following his role in French theory reveals how much that apparent outsider could change the questions asked from within it.
References
Borges, J. L. (1964). Other inquisitions, 1937–1952 (R. L. C. Simms, Trans.). University of Texas Press. (Original work published 1952)
Borges, J. L., & Guerrero, M. (1969). The book of imaginary beings (N. T. di Giovanni, Trans.). E. P. Dutton.
Bosteels, B. (2023). Borges in French theory. In D. Balderston & N. Benedict (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of Jorge Luis Borges (pp. 483–502). Oxford University Press.
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, J. (1978). Violence and metaphysics: An essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. In Writing and difference (A. Bass, Trans., pp. 79–153). University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1967)
Dews, P. (1986). Adorno, post-structuralism and the critique of identity. New Left Review, 1(157), 28–44. https://doi.org/10.64590/jil
Foucault, M. (1994). The order of things: An archaeology of the human sciences. Vintage Books. (Original work published 1966)
Lyotard, J.-F. (1973). Contribution des tableaux de Jacques Monory. In B. Lamarche-Vadel (Ed.), Figurations 1960/1973. Union Générale d’Éditions.

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