A Society Without Reflections: Borges, Adorno, and the Possibility of Political Reconciliation
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| Fauna of Mirrors. AI image |
— Jorge Luis Borges, “Fauna of Mirrors”
1. Borges: Two Worlds, One Mirror
In Borges’s “Fauna of Mirrors,” the human world and the world reflected in mirrors were once distinct, yet their inhabitants could move between them. The two kingdoms lived in harmony: their differences did not prevent contact, and the mirror provided a passage between realms that remained separate.
That relationship came to an end when the inhabitants of the mirrors invaded the human world. After a bloody conflict, the Yellow Emperor defeated them and drove them back into their mirrors. His victory, however, involved more than military subjugation. He deprived them of their powers and forms, forcing them to reproduce human gestures and actions. Borges describes the result as their reduction to “mere slavish reflections.” The mirror creatures remained present, but their capacity to act independently had been suppressed.
The story does not portray them as innocent victims from the beginning: they were the first to cross the boundary and invade the human world. Yet the Emperor’s response establishes a new condition in which the defeated can exist only by imitating their conquerors. Their difference survives, but in a subordinated form.
Eventually, this arrangement begins to break down. A fish is the first creature to awaken, moving in ways that no longer simply reproduce the gestures of human beings. Other shapes gradually stir, and the inhabitants of the mirrors begin to recover their independence. But Borges does not conclude with a renewed harmony. Their awakening anticipates another invasion.
The fable leaves us with a difficult question: when those who have been forced to imitate others recover their freedom, can they establish a different relationship with their former rulers, or will they reproduce the domination they once suffered?
2. When a Part Claims to Be the Whole
«El Partido Comunista de Cuba, único, martiano, fidelista, marxista y leninista […] es la fuerza política dirigente superior de la sociedad y del Estado» (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019, art. 5).
The possibility of recovering freedom without reproducing domination also arises in political life. A society contains groups with different interests, values, and conceptions of the common good. Political parties and movements give these differences an organized form, allowing particular perspectives to enter public debate. Their claims may conflict, and their disagreements may be difficult to resolve, but they remain part of a shared political life.
A problem arises when one political faction claims a status beyond that of a participant in this common life. Instead of presenting its position as one interpretation among others, it identifies its own political project with the interests of society as a whole. Opposition can then be portrayed as a threat to the community itself. Those who disagree are no longer treated as legitimate political interlocutors; they are represented as obstacles to the realization of society’s supposedly true identity.
Political disagreement becomes a question of legitimacy when one faction claims the authority to determine which positions may count as expressions of the community and which must be excluded from it. Historical examples show how this claim to exclusive representation can become an institutional reality.
3. The Historical Suppression of Difference
Hungary after the Second World War offers a particularly clear example of how political competition can be dismantled despite an electoral result that initially favoured a different distribution of power. In the November 1945 elections, the Independent Smallholders’ Party won 57 percent of the vote. The Social Democrats received 17.4 percent, and the Communists 16.9 percent. The Soviet authorities nevertheless insisted on a coalition government, giving the Communists a place in the new administration despite their electoral defeat (Cornelius, 2011; Mevius, 2005).
The Communists gradually expanded their influence over key institutions, particularly the police and security services. Their strategy also involved pressure on political opponents and the fragmentation of rival parties. Through what became known as “salami tactics,” they weakened the Smallholders’ Party by targeting and expelling its members, while encouraging divisions within other political groups. The process intensified after 1945, and by 1947 the party had been seriously weakened. In June 1948, the Social Democrats were merged with the Communists to form a new ruling party. By the autumn of that year, Hungary had become firmly established as a Soviet-style system (Mevius, 2005; Cornelius, 2011).
What matters here is the gradual transformation of political plurality into a largely formal arrangement. Organizations that had once represented independent alternatives were weakened, absorbed, or deprived of the capacity to challenge the ruling party. Their institutional presence could no longer be taken as evidence of genuine political competition.
North Korea provides a contemporary example of a different historical trajectory. The Workers’ Party of Korea controls the state institutions, and there is no genuine competition between political parties for power. Other organizations formally exist, but they do not constitute independent political alternatives (Freedom House, 2026).
These cases are not historically equivalent. They illustrate a narrower point: the presence of different organizations does not by itself establish political pluralism. What matters is whether they can represent alternative positions and act independently. The historical examples thus bring us back to the question of how one political perspective can come to present itself as the complete representation of society.
4. The Limits of Political Identity
Adorno’s critique of identity thinking helps clarify the conceptual difficulty underlying this claim. In Negative Dialectics, he argues that conceptual thought necessarily identifies its objects, bringing them under categories through which they can be understood. Yet the object is never fully contained by the concept. As he writes, “the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived” (Adorno, 1973, p. 5). Something about the particular remains beyond the identity assigned to it.
Concepts are indispensable to thought. The difficulty arises when the conceptual account is mistaken for the entirety of what it describes. In identifying an object, thought necessarily selects certain features and leaves others unexpressed. Identity thinking overlooks this remainder and treats the concept as though it coincided completely with its object.
This distinction can be applied, cautiously, to political representation. A political movement articulates particular interests and experiences, and its programme may offer a compelling account of important social needs. But the society it seeks to represent encompasses more than any single political programme can express. Its reality exceeds the categories through which one movement understands it.
The analogy with Adorno concerns the difference between a particular representation and the more complex reality it seeks to represent. When a political movement overlooks that difference, it risks treating whatever falls outside its own framework as something that does not properly belong. The claim to represent society as a whole thus involves a denial of what exceeds the movement’s own political identity.
Adorno is not offering a theory of political parties or a constitutional account of pluralism. The connection developed here is an interpretive application of his critique of identity thinking. It helps us recognize the limits of any claim to represent a complex whole completely. The question that remains is how the different elements of a society might relate to one another without requiring one to define the others.
5. From Tolerance to Reconciliation
Recognizing the limits of any single political perspective does not, by itself, establish how different perspectives should relate. One possibility is to allow them to coexist while keeping their differences at a distance. Such tolerance can protect groups from exclusion and persecution, but it may leave them with little opportunity to participate in shaping the conditions of their common life.
Adorno’s conception of reconciliation points toward a more demanding possibility. In “On Subject and Object,” he writes: “Peace is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other” (Adorno, 1998, p. 247). The formulation connects the preservation of difference with the possibility of a shared relationship. Peace requires that neither side dominate the other, while the differentiated must be able to participate in one another.
This idea offers a way to distinguish reconciliation from both uniformity and mere coexistence. Uniformity subordinates differences to a dominant identity. Tolerance allows differences to remain, but does not necessarily enable them to shape common life. Reconciliation involves participation without domination: different groups can affect and be affected by one another without having to abandon their distinct positions.
Applied to political society, this suggests that pluralism requires more than the formal permission to hold different convictions. Different groups must be able to contribute to the decisions and institutions that shape their shared existence. A movement that seeks to deprive others of the possibility of participating threatens the conditions on which political coexistence depends. The aim is not to abolish disagreement, but to prevent disagreement from becoming a justification for domination.
Adorno does not provide a constitutional model or a set of institutional arrangements for achieving such a society, but his formulation offers a critical horizon rather than a political blueprint. It allows us to think of unity as a relationship among differences, rather than as the triumph of one identity over all the others.
6. A Common World Without Sameness
Borges’s mirror creatures return us to the difficulty of this possibility. Their awakening marks the recovery of a difference that had been suppressed, but it does not guarantee a new relationship between the two worlds. The creatures prepare to invade the human world, and their return may simply reverse the earlier distribution of power. Those who were once forced to imitate others could become the ones who impose their own identity in turn.
Here the distinction between emancipation and reconciliation becomes decisive. Escaping domination does not necessarily mean overcoming the logic that produced it. A group may recover its independence while retaining the desire to subject others to its own will. The identities of the rulers and the ruled would have changed, but the relationship between them would remain intact.
Borges leaves open the possibility that the two worlds might meet again, although he does not tell us what form that encounter would take. Adorno’s conception of reconciliation helps us formulate what would be required: neither the restoration of the old hierarchy nor its reversal, but a relationship in which each world could retain its difference while participating in a common existence.
The political challenge is therefore to create a society in which no particular group can claim to embody the whole, and in which no group has to surrender its identity to take part in collective life. A common world need not be a world in which everyone becomes the same. It must be one in which no one is required to become someone else’s reflection.
References
Adorno, T. W. (1973). Negative dialectics (E. B. Ashton, Trans.). Continuum. (Original work published 1966)
Adorno, T. W. (1998). On subject and object. In Critical models: Interventions and catchwords (H. W. Pickford, Trans., pp. 245–258). Columbia University Press.
Borges, J. L. (1969). Fauna of mirrors. In The book of imaginary beings (N. T. di Giovanni, Trans.). E. P. Dutton.
Cornelius, D. S. (2011). Postwar Hungary. In Hungary in World War II: Caught in the cauldron (pp. 384–418). Fordham University Press.
Freedom House. (2026). North Korea: Freedom in the World 2026.
Mevius, M. (2005). Salami tactics and national unity (1945–1947). In Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the origins of socialist patriotism, 1941–1953 (pp. 161–190). Oxford University Press.

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