Reality, Language and Thought: Exploring the Ontological, Semantic, and Epistemological Problems in Philosophy of Mind

Introduction

The study of the philosophy and science of mind encompasses a vast array of questions that probe the nature of consciousness, mental states, and their relationship to the physical world. Fundamental inquiries include whether consciousness survives the body's demise, the possibility of conscious intelligence in non-biological systems like computers, and the origin of minds. These questions lie at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory, each contributing unique perspectives and evidence to shape our understanding.

The Ontological Problem in Philosophy of Mind

The questions about the nature of mental states and processes, the medium in which they occur, and their relation to the physical world address what philosophers term the ontological problem, more commonly known as the mind–body problem. This problem has two primary perspectives. Materialist theories of mind assert that mental states and processes are merely sophisticated states and processes of a complex physical system, specifically the brain. In contrast, dualist theories claim that mental states and processes are not simply physical states and processes but constitute a distinct kind of phenomenon that is essentially nonphysical.

People often approach this issue with strong preconceptions, sometimes thinking the choice between materialism and dualism is straightforward. However, it is essential to remain open-minded and thoroughly explore the different theories before forming a judgment. The debate is not simply a binary choice between two theories. As we will see later, it is not a matter of choosing either materialism or dualism, but rather considering both for their respective strengths.

The Language Problem in Philosophy of Mind

The semantic issue in the philosophy of mind revolves around how we attribute meaning to mental state terms such as "pain," "happiness," or "belief" (Gáliková 2013). One prevailing view posits that individuals acquire the meaning of these terms through their subjective experiences. For instance, when someone experiences a headache, they associate the term "headache" with that particular sensation. However, this approach raises significant challenges. A major concern is the variability in subjective experiences among different individuals. How can we be certain that the sensation someone else labels as "headache" corresponds qualitatively to our own experience? This skepticism arises because direct access to another person's mental states is inherently inaccessible; we can only infer their mental states based on their behavior, verbal reports, and external cues.

Moreover, this language problem calls into question the universality of mental state terms across different linguistic communities and cultures. If mental state terms derive their meaning solely from subjective experiences, do they possess consistent meanings across all individuals? This uncertainty challenges the communicative function of language, which fundamentally relies on the assumption of shared meanings for effective interpersonal understanding.

An alternative approach suggests that mental state terms derive their meaning from their causal relations and observable manifestations. According to this view, understanding "headache" involves recognizing it as a state caused by physical distress, which in turn produces certain physiological responses and observable behaviors, such as wincing or groaning. The significance of mental state terms, therefore, is understood in a systemic way. The term "headache" is comprehended in relation to interconnected concepts like "physical distress," "wincing," and "groaning." This systemic understanding implies that the meaning of a term is not isolated to an individual's subjective experience but is embedded within a network of causally related phenomena and observable behaviors. Such an approach potentially offers a more robust framework for ensuring that these terms maintain consistent meanings across different linguistic and cultural contexts, thus enhancing the communicative efficacy of language.

This causal network approach aligns with a materialist perspective by linking mental states directly to physical processes, grounding their meaning in objective, observable phenomena. In contrast, dualists have tended to favor the first approach, where individuals acquire the meaning of terms through their subjective experiences.

A Third Way: Bridging Materialist and Dualist Theories through Saussurean Linguistics

As an element in a system, the word has not only a meaning but also – above all – a value. And that is something quite different. [CGL] [160]

Ferdinand de Saussure introduces a nuanced understanding of how words derive their significance. He makes a crucial distinction between the "linguistic value" of a word and its "meaning." The meaning of a word is the idea or concept it represents. This aligns with the dualists' view, who posit that when someone experiences a headache, they associate the term "headache" (signifier) with that particular sensation (signified). In contrast, linguistic value is more complex and involves the word's position and relationships within the entire language system, akin to the materialists' belief that terms derive their meaning from their causal relations with one another, advocating for a causal network approach.

To understand this better, consider that a word comprises two parts: a sound pattern (signifier) and a concept (signified). This pairing forms the basic unit of language, known as the linguistic sign (signe). At first glance, it might seem that the concept is simply the counterpart of the sound pattern, and together they form a self-contained unit:

                                                                                                                           [CGL] [159]

However, Saussure points out a paradox here. While a word functions as a single linguistic sign, it also exists within a larger system of language where its value is influenced by its relationships with other words, emphasizing the importance of this systemic context:

                                                                                                                                [CGL] [159]

The value of a word is not determined solely by the concept it represents but also by how it fits into the broader system of language. Each word's value arises from its difference and opposition to other words. For example, the word "sheep" gains its value not only from what it means but also from how it contrasts with words like "goat" or "lamb."

Ultimately, Saussure argues that a word's significance, or "value," is shaped by both its meaning and its relationships within the linguistic system. Understanding a word fully requires looking beyond its isolated meaning to its place within the entire network of language. This systemic approach reveals that the content of a word is determined not just by what it contains but also by what exists outside it, in relation to other words.

At this juncture, it seems evident that materialist and dualist theorists don’t necessarily exclude each other but could be considered complementary. Following Saussurean theory, we find that the materialist perspective advocating for a causal network approach and the dualist perspective of subjective experiences can coexist, offering a more comprehensive understanding of the mind.

Conclusion

In exploring the philosophy of mind through the lens of Saussurean linguistics, we find a compelling reconciliation between materialist and dualist perspectives. The materialist viewpoint emphasizes that mental state terms derive their meaning from observable causal relations and manifestations, akin to Saussure's emphasis on a word's value within a linguistic system. On the other hand, dualist theories highlight the subjective experiences that underpin our understanding of these terms, akin to Saussure's concept of a word's isolated meaning or signified.

Saussure's distinction between a word's meaning (signified) and its value within the language system provides a bridge between these seemingly divergent perspectives. Just as a word gains significance not only from its concept but also from its systemic relations with other words, the understanding of mental states can integrate both their subjective experiential aspects and their objective causal relationships. This synthesis suggests that materialist and dualist interpretations need not be mutually exclusive but can complement each other, offering a richer framework for comprehending the complexities of the mind.

 Cite this page: "Return to Saussure." http://www.derridaforlinguists.blogspot.com

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Bibliography

Gáliková, Silvia, ed. Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cognitive Studies Edition. Kraków: Towarzystwo Słowaków w Polsce; Filozofická fakulta Trnavskej univerzity v Trnave, 2013.

Crawford, Sean, ed. General Introduction to Philosophy of Mind. Critical Concepts of Philosophy, 4 vols. London: Routledge, 2011.

Feser, Edward. Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction. First South Asian Edition. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006.